Resolving the Anders Dilemmas: How & Why Texas Should Abandon the Anders Procedure by Ritter, Michael J.
St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & 
Ethics 
Volume 12 Number 1 Article 3 
1-4-2022 
Resolving the Anders Dilemmas: How & Why Texas Should 
Abandon the Anders Procedure 
Michael J. Ritter 
michaeljamesritter@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/lmej 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, 
Criminal Procedure Commons, Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, Law and Race Commons, 
Law and Society Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Legal Remedies 
Commons, Social Justice Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael J. Ritter, Resolving the Anders Dilemmas: How & Why Texas Should Abandon the Anders 
Procedure, 12 ST. MARY'S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 94 (2022). 
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/lmej/vol12/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St. 
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics by an 






Michael J. Ritter 
Resolving the Anders Dilemmas: 
How & Why Texas Should Abandon the Anders Procedure 
Abstract.  When an indigent defendant has a right to counsel for an appeal, 
and counsel believes the appeal is wholly frivolous, Texas has adopted the 
Anders v. California procedure that permits counsel to withdraw from 
representation and argue to the appellate court why their client’s appeal is 
wholly frivolous.  This Article argues that, either by a change to the disciplinary 
rules or by judicial decision, Texas should abandon the Anders procedure as 
other states have.  Doing so will promote the integrity of the right to counsel, 
avoid numerous conflicts and dilemmas created by the Anders procedure, and 
advance judicial efficiency and public confidence in Texas’s criminal justice 
system. 
Author.  Michael J. Ritter is Senior Counsel at Schmoyer Reinhard LLP in 
San Antonio, Texas.  He is Texas Board of Legal Specialization-certified in both 
Civil Appellate Law and Criminal Appellate Law, Past President of the Texas 
Association of Appellate Court Attorneys, a former career staff attorney at the 
4th Court of Appeals in San Antonio, and a Sustaining Life Fellow of the Texas 
Bar Foundation.  The views expressed in this Article are the author’s personal 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
A criminal conviction permits governments to impose the most serious 
deprivations of individual rights.  These deprivations can take the form of 
seizure of property, decades-long incarceration, and even the death penalty.1  
Because criminal convictions authorize the severest forms of punishment, a 
criminal conviction in the United States and Texas requires the highest level 
of certainty—a jury’s certainty beyond a reasonable doubt—that a 
defendant has committed a criminal offense.2  The United States and Texas 
have pursued obtaining this level of certainty by subjecting those accused of 
criminal offenses to an adversarial justice system structured to advance 
truth-seeking.3  Advancing truth-seeking requires protecting the legitimacy 
of core constitutional rights: (1) the right against self-incrimination; (2) the 
 
1. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.01–12.51 (providing a range of punishments for 
Texas criminal cases). 
2. Id. § 2.01; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958).  
3. Coronado v. State, 351 S.W.3d 315, 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (stating, in a 
Confrontation Clause case, the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings promotes truth-seeking). 
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right to a trial by jury; (3) the right to confront accusers; (4) and the right to 
counsel.4  But the legitimacy of these rights and procedural protections are 
often questioned from utilitarian and public policy perspectives when they 
interfere with effective law enforcement or are costly to taxpayers.5   
One such costly right is the right of indigent criminal defendants to 
appointed counsel.  The crime–poverty cycle, institutional racism, and other 
societal forces cause the mass criminal prosecution of indigent individuals 
who are unable to afford counsel.6  The truth-seeking benefits of basic 
constitutional rights are essential in such prosecutions, just as they are in the 
prosecution of nonindigent defendants.  But because nonindigent 
defendants can afford to pay the private counsel of their choice and counsel 
appointed to represent indigent defendants are paid by taxpayers, indigent 
criminal defendants’ right to appointed counsel is subject to more public 
criticism and questioning than the right to counsel for nonindigent 
defendants.7  Thus, the legitimacy of indigent defendants’ right to counsel 
is often questioned from utilitarian and public policy perspectives, especially 
when it reasonably appears a defendant lacks a non-frivolous basis for 
denying criminal liability.  
Appointing counsel to frivolously defend a criminal defendant at trial also 
presents ethical concerns because Texas lawyers are generally prohibited 
from frivolously defending a proceeding or asserting frivolous issues 
therein.8  But like most other jurisdictions, Texas prioritizes an indigent 
defendant’s right to appointed counsel at trial over defense counsel’s 
 
4. See id. (discussing the right of confrontation and having a jury as the trier of fact); see also 
Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956) (explaining the 
right to counsel is necessary to safeguard all other rights).  
5. See generally Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for Their Court-
Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323 (2009) (discussing 
many jurisdictions’ attempts to displace costs back onto indigent defendants through recoupment and 
contribution programs).  
6. See V. Noah Gimbel & Craig Muhammad, Are Police Obsolete? Breaking Cycles of Violence Through 
Abolition Democracy, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1453, 1471 (2019) (discussing implications of prosecuting 
indigent defendants); Jonathan Simon, Is Mass Incarceration History?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2017) 
(reviewing ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: 
THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016)) (acknowledging mass prosecution and 
incarceration in America).  
7. See Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years After ‘Gideon’, 
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/how-
americans-lost-the-right-to-counsel-50-years-after-gideon/273433 [https://perma.cc/8HKS-FBH7] 
(“No one wants to pay for more public defenders.”).  
8. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 
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conflicting obligation not to frivolously defend against a proceeding.  So, 
even when the defendant freely confesses or when faced with what appears 
to be irrefutable and conclusive evidence of the defendant’s guilt, appointed 
trial counsel’s zealous representation may include frivolously arguing the 
jury should find the defendant not guilty.9  An appointed criminal defense 
attorney may not thereafter be disciplined by the State Bar of Texas for 
asserting frivolous defenses to the elements of the state’s case.  But once a 
criminal defendant is found guilty, the general ethical prohibition against 
lawyers asserting frivolous issues remains applicable to appointed appellate 
counsel, who may be disciplined for asserting a frivolous issue on appeal.10 
When a criminal appellant’s right to appointed appellate counsel conflicts 
with appointed counsel’s ethical obligation not to assert frivolous issues, 
Texas and most other jurisdictions take a reverse approach: counsel’s ethical 
obligation not to assert frivolous issues is prioritized over the appellant’s 
right to appointed counsel.11  When appointed appellate counsel determines 
the appeal is wholly frivolous, Texas courts require counsel to file a motion 
to withdraw, expressing frivolity as the basis for the motion.12  The motion 
to withdraw must be supported by a full appellate brief that refers the court 
of appeals to all potential issues that could be raised and explains why those 
issues are frivolous.13  If counsel is correct, the appellate court must grant 
counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the conviction.14  This procedure, 
approved by the Supreme Court of the United States in Anders v. 
California,15 raises numerous ethical, practical, and intellectual quagmires 
that are sometimes referred to as “Anders dilemmas.”16 
This Article posits that Texas should join the minority of jurisdictions 
that have abandoned the Anders procedure, and thereby prioritize indigent 
criminal appellants’ right to counsel over the conflicting concern about 
appointed appellate counsel presenting a frivolous issue on appeal.  
Abandoning the Anders procedure would not only promote the integrity of 
 
9. Id.; see TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01 cmt. 3, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (discussing the nuances of frivolity). 
10. See id. (providing a trial attorney may defend against a suit to require the state to meet its 
burden of proof, but not containing a similar exception for appellate counsel).  
11. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 406–407; see infra Part V (noting most other jurisdictions follow 
the Anders procedure).  
12.  In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 407. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 409.  
15. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
16. Id. at 744–45; see infra Part V (discussing various Anders dilemmas).  
  
2021] Resolving the Anders Dilemmas 99 
the right to counsel on appeal but also be more beneficial from utilitarian, 
economic, and public policy perspectives.  This Article proposes that Texas 
abandon the Anders procedure by narrowly extending the existing exception 
for criminal trial counsel in Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional 
Conduct rule 3.01 to include any appeal in which an indigent appellant has 
the right to appointed appellate counsel.17  Courts should also abandon the 
Anders procedure; just as appointed trial counsel may not withdraw on the 
grounds that they believe a client’s defense is frivolous, appointed appellate 
counsel should not be permitted to withdraw merely because they believe 
the client’s appeal is frivolous.  Instead, just as appointed trial counsel may 
argue the state has not satisfied its burden, even if the argument is frivolous, 
appointed appellate counsel should be permitted to argue a similar issue on 
appeal, even if the issue is ultimately frivolous.  Part II of this Article 
addresses societal forces generating mass criminal prosecutions of indigent 
persons.  Part III discusses indigent defendants’ right to appointed counsel.  
Part IV addresses appointed counsel’s ethical obligations.  Part V explains 
the Anders procedure and variants adopted by other jurisdictions.  Finally, 
Part VI explains how and why Texas should abandon the Anders procedure.  
II.    THE MASS PROSECUTION & RIGHTS OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 
The vast majority of criminal prosecutions in the United States and in 
Texas are of indigent defendants.  An estimated 60%–90% of criminal 
defendants are indigent.18  Since the 1970s, the United States has witnessed 
mass incarceration of indigent people.19  The increasing number of 
Americans living in poverty has only contributed to this mass incarceration; 
poverty and systemic racism perpetuate cycles of crime, including violence, 
drugs, and the breakdown of families.20 
Yet our indigent-defense system has remained in a state of crisis for 
decades.21  “[T]he sad reality is that in America today, economic status can 
determine the type of justice you receive[,]” and indigent defendants are 
therefore less likely to have their constitutional rights secured through a 
 
17. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R 3.01 cmt. 3, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (providing a trial attorney may defend against a suit to require the 
state to meet its burden of proof, but not containing a similar exception for appellate counsel).  
18. Bill Piatt, Reinventing the Wheel: Constructing Ethical Approaches to State Indigent Legal Defense 
Systems, 2 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 372, 375 (2012). 
19. Simon, supra note 6, at 1078, 1083–84. 
20. Gimbel & Muhammad, supra note 6, at 1471.  
21. Piatt, supra note 18, at 375. 
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rigorous defense.22  The lack of public funding for indigent defense over-
limits the number of public defenders, causing public defender offices to 
become overwhelmed.23  This situation is no less true in Texas.  “For 
decades, Texans who can’t afford a lawyer have gotten caught in a criminal 
justice system that’s crippled by inadequate funding and overloaded 
attorneys.”24 
Systemic disparate treatment of indigent defendants contributes to the 
cycle of poverty and crime.  Criminal prosecutions and convictions 
frequently result in criminal fines.25  Criminal fines “perpetuate poverty, 
aggravate racial disparities because they disproportionately affect 
communities of color, and erode trust in the legal system.”26  Additionally, 
mass incarceration of indigent people makes it more difficult for individuals 
exiting the criminal justice system to escape poverty and increases the risk 
of recidivism.  Furthermore, most death row inmates are also indigent.27 
Criminal prosecutions and convictions for certain types of offenses (such 
as drug possession, child abuse or neglect, and sexual assault) can also carry 
civil implications, such as subjecting the indigent defendant to civil 
proceedings to terminate their parental rights to their children and, in some 
cases involving certain sex offenses, to civilly commit a defendant.  These 
related civil proceedings further contribute to the cycle of poverty by 
subjecting more and more children to foster care, further breaking down the 
family, and increasing the rate of juvenile delinquency for those living in 
poverty.28  
Due to the severity of criminal penalties and the potential loss of liberty 
in juvenile and parental termination proceedings, defendants in such 
proceedings are afforded a wide variety of constitutional and statutory 
rights.  The criminal rights, such as the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights—
 
22. Hilarie Bass, Poverty Is Not a Crime, 104 ABA J. 8, 8 (2018). 
23. Id. 
24. Neena Satija, How Judicial Conflicts of Interest are Denying Poor Texans Their Right to an Effective 
Lawyer, TEX. TRIB. 1 (Aug. 19, 2019), www.texastribune.org/2019/08/19/unchecked-power-texas-
judges-indigent-defense [https://perma.cc/6UY7-MGFC]. 
25. Bass, supra note 22, at 8. 
26.  Id. 
27. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the Post Conviction Defense Organizations as a Denial 
of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 863, 917 (1996) (“Since most death row inmates are indigent, 
the taxpayers of California bear this cost and the high court in California reviews about thirty new 
death penalty cases per year.”). 
28. See Gimbel & Muhammad, supra note 6, at 1478–79 (“When a parent is incarcerated, the 
child that is left behind becomes collateral damage . . . .”).  
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including the rights against self-incrimination, double jeopardy, rights to a 
speedy and public trial, an impartial jury, notice of charges, confrontation of 
witnesses, and the assistance of counsel—are structured to protect innocent 
individuals from wrongful convictions and to advance the truth-seeking 
function of the justice system.29  But “[o]f all of the rights that an accused 
person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most 
pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.”30  
Consequently, the truth-seeking benefits of these rights cannot be fully 
realized without the rigorous protection and enforcement of an accused’s 
right to counsel.  
III.    THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN TEXAS 
In Texas, individuals charged with criminal offenses generally have a state 
and federal constitutional right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.”31  The federal right applies to state court proceedings in Texas 
through the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.32  The Texas 
Constitution provides an analogous right to counsel, “In all criminal 
prosecutions[,] the accused . . . shall have the right of being heard by himself 
or counsel . . . .”33  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held the state 
constitutional right of counsel is coterminous with, and provides no greater 
protections than, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.34  
Thus, under both federal and state constitutions, a criminal defendant in 
Texas has the right to effective assistance of counsel at trial and, when a 
direct appeal is permitted, on direct appeal.35  “[O]nce the [s]tate chooses 
to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents 
from access to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty.”36  
However, this right to counsel in a criminal appeal does not include the right 
 
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V & VI; accord Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 
84 GEO. L.J. 641, 698 (1996) (referring to “the entire innocence-protecting and truth-seeking structure 
of the Sixth Amendment”).  
30. Schaefer, supra note 4, at 8. 
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
32. Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 122–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–41 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963)). 
33. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
34. Jacobs v. State, 560 S.W.3d 205, 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). 
35. Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 122. 
36. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959). 
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to choice of appointed counsel or extend to the assistance of counsel in 
seeking discretionary review from a higher court.37   
The Texas Legislature has also provided a statutory right of counsel for 
indigent defendants in criminal proceedings and in some civil proceedings, 
implicating a defendant’s fundamental liberty interests.  The Texas Code of 
Criminal Procedure provides, “[a] defendant in a criminal matter is entitled 
to be represented by counsel in an adversarial judicial proceeding.”38  This 
“includes the right to consult in private with counsel sufficiently in advance 
of a proceeding to allow adequate preparation for the proceeding.”39  “An 
indigent defendant is entitled to have an attorney appointed to represent 
him in any adversary judicial proceeding that may result in punishment by 
confinement and in any other criminal proceeding if the court concludes 
that the interests of justice require representation.”40  In a criminal 
proceeding: 
An eligible indigent defendant is entitled to have the trial court appoint an 
attorney to represent him in the following appellate and postconviction 
habeas corpus matters: (1) an appeal to a court of appeals; (2) an appeal to the 
Court of Criminal Appeals if the appeal is made directly from the trial court 
or if a petition for discretionary review has been granted; (3) a habeas corpus 
proceeding if the court concludes that the interests of justice require 
representation; and (4) any other appellate proceeding if the court concludes 
that the interests of justice require representation.41 
The Texas Legislature has further provided for the right to counsel in civil 
commitment proceedings and government-initiated proceedings to 
terminate a parent–child relationship.42  In the latter civil proceedings, the 
right to appellate counsel extends through the exhaustion of all appeals, 
which—unlike criminal appeals—includes the right to counsel for 
discretionary review by a higher court.43  When an indigent defendant has 
a right to counsel, the court generally must appoint counsel, which creates 
 
37. Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 122. 
38. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(a).  
39. Id.  
40. Id. art. 1.051(c). 
41. Id. art. 1.051(d). 
42. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.016.  
43. In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 26 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE 
§ 107.016(2)).   
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an attorney–client relationship between appointed counsel and the indigent 
party. 
IV.    APPOINTED COUNSEL’S ETHICS OBLIGATIONS IN TEXAS 
The commencement of an attorney–client relationship between 
appointed counsel and an indigent defendant creates a fiduciary relationship 
and obligates the attorney to comply with all applicable professional ethics 
rules contained in the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct 
(TDRPC) in the scope of the attorney’s representation.  Generally, the 
duties of a fiduciary, such as an attorney, include the duty of care, a duty of 
good faith, and a duty of loyalty.44  The duty of loyalty requires an attorney 
not to act to the client’s detriment.  
Furthermore, rule 1.01, the very first rule that appears in the TDRPC, 
requires zealousness in representation.45  A comment to rule 1.01 explain 
the duty of diligence, “a lawyer should act . . . with zeal in advocacy upon 
the client’s behalf.  A lawyer should feel a moral or professional obligation 
to pursue a matter on behalf of a client with reasonable diligence and 
promptness despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to 
the lawyer.”46  Other TDRPC rules govern the attorney–client relationship, 
require the lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the status 
of the case, and to sufficiently advise the client to allow them to make 
reasonably informed decisions about their legal rights.47  
But appointed counsel’s ethical duties to a client are circumscribed by 
limits on counsel’s role as an advocate.  For instance, although it might 
advance a client’s interest to delay litigation and increase the costs to and 
burdens on the state, rule 3.02 provides, “[i]n the course of litigation, a 
lawyer shall not take a position that unreasonably increases the costs or 
other burdens of the case or that unreasonably delays resolution of the 
matter.”48  Counsel must also be candid with the court about certain 
matters; rule 3.03 prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making material 
misrepresentations to the court and “fail[ing] to disclose to the tribunal 
 
44. See D’Andrea v. Epstein, Becker, Green, Wickliff & Hall, P.C., 418 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (stating such duties include “a duty of reasonable 
prudence and fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith”). 
45. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.01, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., 
tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A. 
46. Id. at R. 1.01 cmt. 6. 
47. Id. at R. 1.03. 
48. Id. at R. 3.02. 
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authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly 
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing 
counsel . . . .”49 
Rule 3.01, the rule against frivolity, provides another limit on counsel’s 
role as an advocate: “A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or 
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless the lawyer reasonably believes 
that there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.”50  An assertion is 
“frivolous” if a “lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument that 
the action taken is consistent with existing law or that it may be supported 
by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of 
existing law.”51  Comment 3 to rule 3.01 contains an important caveat: “[A] 
lawyer for a defendant in any criminal proceeding or for the respondent in 
a proceeding that could result in commitment may so defend the proceeding 
as to require that every element of the case be established.”52  
Read in context of comment 3, rule 3.01 has three parts: (1) a lawyer shall 
not bring or defend a frivolous proceeding; (2) a lawyer shall not assert a 
frivolous issue in a proceeding; and (3) a lawyer may defend a criminal 
defendant or respondent in a commitment proceeding, so as to require the 
prosecution to prove every element of each charge.53  So, to the general 
prohibition against asserting frivolous issues, the third part of the rule 
against frivolity exempts certain defense lawyers at trial—specifically, 
lawyers defending a client against a criminal prosecution or in a civil 
proceeding in which a respondent could be committed.54 
V.    THE ANDERS PROCEDURE: ITS DILEMMAS, VARIANTS, 
CRITICISMS & DEFENSES 
An indigent defendant’s right to counsel, and rule 3.01’s prohibition 
against frivolity, can sometimes conflict.55  When appointed trial counsel 
determines an indigent client’s defense is wholly frivolous, rule 3.01 permits 
trial counsel to frivolously defend against the proceeding.56  But if the 
 
49. Id. at R. 3.03. 
50. Id. at R. 3.01. 
51. Id. at R. 3.01 cmt. 2. 
52. Id. at R. 3.01 cmt. 3. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (explaining an indigent’s 
right to counsel); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01. 
56. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01 cmts. 2–3. 
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defendant is convicted, and decides to exercise their right to appeal, and the 
corresponding right to obtain the assistance of counsel for a direct appeal, 
appointed appellate counsel is held to a different standard than trial 
counsel.57  In Texas, when appointed appellate counsel determines the 
client’s appeal is wholly frivolous, rule 3.01 prohibits appellate counsel from 
filing a brief in support of the appeal if doing so requires asserting a frivolous 
issue.58  Instead, appointed appellate counsel in Texas must follow what is 
known as the Anders procedure.59  
A. The Anders Procedure  
In Texas, when appointed appellate counsel concludes a client’s criminal 
appeal is wholly frivolous, counsel must file a motion to withdraw, 
supported by a brief that fully explains counsel’s conclusion that the appeal 
is wholly frivolous.60  This procedure is known as “the Anders procedure,” 
named after the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Anders v. California.61  In Anders, the Supreme Court held that allowing 
appointed counsel to withdraw under these circumstances does not violate 
an indigent defendant’s constitutional right to counsel on direct appeal, 
subject to some important limitations.62  The Court in Anders explained 
counsel may be allowed to withdraw only if: (1) the client is provided an 
explanation of why the appeal is frivolous; and (2) the appellate court 
independently reviews the entire record to determine whether counsel 
properly concluded the appeal is wholly frivolous.63  When appointed 
counsel files an Anders brief in support of a motion to withdraw, the 
appellant may file a pro se response, objecting to the motion by identifying 
potentially non-frivolous issues for the court to consider.64  If the reviewing 
court agrees the appeal is wholly frivolous, then the court must grant the 
motion to withdraw and affirm the conviction and sentence.65  If the 
reviewing court disagrees, then the court must nevertheless grant counsel’s 
motion to withdraw but must identify any non-frivolous issues the court 
 
57. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 406 (requiring appointed appellate counsel to file a motion 




61. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
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discovered and appoint new appellate counsel to brief the identified issue or 
issues.66   
Like courts in the vast majority of jurisdictions, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals has adopted the Anders procedure, doing so in 1974 in 
Currie v. State.67  But after Currie, the Supreme Court of the United States 
clarified that the Anders procedure is simply one method of allowing states 
to accommodate their interests in not permitting lawyers to raise frivolous 
issues, while providing adequate safeguards to the defendant’s right to 
counsel.68  Despite this clarification, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
has continued to require appointed counsel to follow the Anders procedure 
when concluding an appeal is wholly frivolous.69  The Supreme Court of 
Texas and Texas’s intermediate appellate courts have followed suit for 
resolving analogous conflicts between an appellant’s right to counsel and 
the rule against frivolity in civil appeals from juvenile delinquency 
proceedings, civil commitment proceedings, and government-initiated 
proceedings to terminate a parent–child relationship or to deprive a parent 
of custody.70  However, the Anders procedure varies slightly in parental 
termination appeals; counsel is not permitted to withdraw in the 
intermediate court solely on the ground of frivolity because the appellant 
has the right to counsel through the filing of a petition for review.71 
B. The Anders Dilemmas  
The Anders procedure was adopted to mediate the conflict between the 
client’s right to counsel and counsel’s obligation not to assert frivolous 
issues, resolving the conflict in favor of attorneys protecting themselves and 
courts rather than advancing their clients’ interests.72  The procedure’s 
 
66. Id. 
67. Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
68. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 265 (2000). 
69. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“The attorney’s duty to 
withdraw is based upon his professional and ethical responsibilities as an officer of the court not to 
burden the judicial system with false claims, frivolous pleadings, or burdensome time demands.”). 
70. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 26 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (describing parental termination 
appeals); In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. 1998) (outlining the rules for juvenile appeals); In re 
State ex rel. Best Interest & Prot. of L.E.H., 228 S.W.3d 219, 220 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no 
pet.) (concluding the Anders procedure is appropriate when appealing involuntary civil commitment). 
71. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 26 (holding a motion to withdraw may not be granted in the 
court of appeals because a parent’s right to counsel extends to filing a petition for review in the 
Supreme Court of Texas). 
72. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 407–08. 
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unusual features result in several quagmires that courts, judges, and 
commentators refer to as “dilemmas” or “Anders dilemmas.”73  These 
dilemmas typically involve conflicting ethical and public policy 
considerations, and most result from the realignment of nearly every person 
and entity involved in an appeal.  Appointed counsel abandons the client 
and aligns themself with the state’s interest.  The court abandons its role as 
a neutral arbiter to temporarily align itself with the appellant’s interest, and 
then shifts back into its neutral role.  And the state’s role is eliminated almost 
entirely.  
1. The “Arguable” Dilemma 
The first Anders dilemma identified was in Justice Stewart’s dissent in 
Anders.74  The Anders majority stated counsel should identify for the court 
any “arguable” issues, and then explain in a brief why those arguable issues 
are frivolous.75  Justice Stewart contended that this requirement places 
counsel in a dilemma because if the issue is “arguable,” then the issue is not 
frivolous.76  The Anders majority’s use of the word “arguable” was 
unfortunate because its vagueness continues to cause misunderstanding 
among members of the bench, the bar, and academia.77  The Anders 
majority most likely intended “arguable” to mean potential issues that could 
be asserted on appeal based on issues that were preserved or that did not 
need to be preserved.  Thus, the first Anders dilemma identified is not truly 
an ethical dilemma, but a matter of semantics. Nevertheless, this matter of 
 
73. See id. at 406 n.8 (quoting both Texas and Supreme Court decisions referring to the Anders 
“dilemma”); In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d at 299 (referring to appointed counsel’s dilemma in an Anders 
case); In re N.F.M., 582 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, no pet.) (en banc) 
(Marion, C.J., dissenting) (“When an attorney is appointed to represent an indigent parent in an appeal 
of an order terminating parental rights, and the attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, however, the 
attorney faces an ethical dilemma.”); WAYNE LEFAVE ET AL., 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2(c) 
(4th ed. 2019) (discussing the Anders rules and jurisdictions’ responses to the Anders dilemma).  
74. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 746 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the record 
did present any such ‘arguable’ issues, the appeal would not be frivolous and counsel would not have 
filed a ‘no-merit’ letter in the first place.”).  
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. See, e.g., Zuniga v. State, No. 04-17-00058-CR, 2018 WL 3551189, at *2 (Tex. App.— 
San Antonio July 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (Marion, C.J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he case law regarding what constitutes an ‘arguable’ ground for appeal is less than clear.”).   
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semantics, what is “arguable,” is one continuing source of criticism of the 
Anders procedure.78 
2. Attorney vs. Client 
Courts and commentators have identified another Anders dilemma; one 
that pits the attorney against the client.79  Typically, an attorney must align 
themself with their client’s goals.  The attorney acts as the client’s agent in 
advancing those goals.  The Anders procedure, by contrast, not only 
misaligns attorney and client, but also resituates the attorney as the client’s 
opposition.  Thus, the Anders procedure creates an unavoidable dilemma 
that requires an attorney—a fiduciary of the client—to act contrary to the 
client’s interests.80 
3. Attorney vs. Self 
Another dilemma created by the Anders procedure is the internal ethical 
conflict of appointed appellate counsel.  An attorney must diligently or 
zealously represent the client, comply with the fiduciary duty of loyalty to 
the client, and provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel.81  The 
attorney’s ethical obligation not to assert a frivolous issue or advance a 
frivolous appeal creates an internal conflict with these other legal and ethical 
duties.82 
Some attorneys might personally prefer to withdraw from representation 
than face the discomforts of briefing a frivolous issue with a court and risk 
their credibility.  But other attorneys might prefer to raise a frivolous issue 
than to face the discomfort of abandoning and advocating against their 
client and might err on the side of presenting frivolous issues.  If the 
attorney misjudges the case, arguing the appeal is wholly frivolous; but the 
 
78. See infra Part V (discussing the criticisms of Anders); see also Andrew S. Pollis, Fixing the Broken 
System of Assessing Criminal Appeals for Frivolousness, 53 AKRON L. REV. 481, 483 (2019) (arguing the 
Anders procedure is “fraught with difficulties”). 
79.  Pollis, supra note 78, at 506; Cynthia Yee, Comment, The Anders Brief and the Idaho Rule: 
It Is Time for Idaho to Reevaluate Criminal Appeals After Rejecting the Anders Procedure, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 143, 
153 (2002). 
80. See Pollis, supra note 78, at 506 (“A lawyer who can unearth no nonfrivolous argument for 
appeal is thus faced with two untenable options: abandoning the loyalty she owes the client or risking 
professional misconduct.”); Yee, supra note 79, at 153. 
81. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.01 cmt. 6, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A. 
82. Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.01 cmt. 6 (requiring diligent 
zealous representation); with id. at R. 3.01 (forbidding frivolous issues).  
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court disagrees, the attorney may have violated other ethical and legal 
duties.83 
4. The Appellate Court vs. Itself 
Yet another dilemma created by the Anders procedure is the appellate 
court’s internal conflict of whether to follow Anders properly in identifying 
non-frivolous issues, or to only identify meritorious issues.  Under Anders, 
Texas law recognizes a distinction between meritorious issues that would 
result in a reversal, and non-meritorious issues that would not result in a 
reversal.84  But not all non-meritorious issues are frivolous.  Thus, non-
meritorious issues may be frivolous or non-frivolous.85  To be frivolous, an 
issue must satisfy the definition provided in comment 2 of rule 3.01.86  And 
not all non-meritorious issues necessarily lack a good-faith basis.87  
This distinction gives rise to an internal conflict for the appellate court in 
conducting an independent review of the record under Anders.  When 
reviewing the record for non-frivolous issues, the court often considers the 
merits of the identified issue to determine whether the argument could be 
advanced in good faith.  A dilemma arises when the court concludes an issue 
is non-frivolous but would not be meritorious.  If the court strictly follows 
Anders, the court must engage in a clear waste of judicial resources by: 
(1) issuing an opinion or order identifying the issue; (2) ordering the 
substitution of a replacement attorney, requiring the county to pay two 
lawyers instead of just one; (3) having the replacement attorney file a merits 
brief; and (4) rejecting the issue identified by the court for replacement 
counsel to brief in another written opinion.88  Because Texas’s intermediate 
courts perceive themselves as “exceptionally busy,”89 the Anders procedure 
creates a dilemma that encourages appellate courts to not truly follow Anders 
by reviewing the record only for meritorious issues.  
 
83. See Matthew D. Fazekas, Note, An Open Letter to the Ohio Supreme Court: Setting A Uniform 
Standard on Anders Briefs, 68 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 581, 602 (2020) (noting counsel’s conflict of interest 
between his or her duties as a lawyer and duties to the client). 
84. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01 cmt. 3 (defining, in a specific 
manner, a frivolous issue as requiring more than an issue that lacks merit).  
85. Id.  
86. Id. at R. 3.01 cmt. 2. 
87. Id. 
88. See Randall L. Hodgkinson, No-Merit Briefs Undermine the Adversary Process in Criminal Appeals, 
3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 55, 56–57 (2001) (“When reviewing a no-merit brief, an appellate court or 
staff attorney has little motivation to find possible error.”). 
89. Michael J. Ritter, En Banc Review in Texas Courts of Appeals, REV. LITIG. 377, 437 (2020). 
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The court’s internal dilemma also raises a concern about the disparate 
treatment of appellants whose counsel files an Anders brief and appellants 
whose counsel does not.  When appointed or retained appellate counsel files 
a brief in support of their client’s appeal, the appellate court typically does 
not review the record for any unassigned errors.90  Consequently, an 
appellant whose counsel files an Anders brief tends to get preferential 
treatment by the court of appeals, which reviews the record for potentially 
meritorious issues, when other appellants usually do not get the benefit of 
the appellate court independently reviewing the whole record for arguable 
issues.91 
5. The Appellate Court vs. the State 
In some cases, the Anders procedure also creates a conflict between the 
appellate court and the state.  After appointed appellate counsel files an 
Anders brief and motion to withdraw, the appellate court must not only 
review counsel’s analysis of the points identified in the Anders brief but also 
conduct an independent review of the record to determine: (1) whether 
appellate counsel failed to identify any potential issue; and (2) if so, whether 
the unidentified issue by counsel is non-frivolous.  In this second step, the 
appellate court must temporarily shift into the role of advocate to assess 
potential issues appellant might raise.   
If the court identifies any non-frivolous issues, the court must then order 
replacement counsel to brief the identified issue.  Because the court has 
already identified the issue as non-frivolous, the court may be biased toward 
sustaining the issue it identified.  If the court does not sustain the issue on 
re-briefing, the court would appear inconsistent and waste judicial resources.  
Consequently, the Anders procedure compromises the court’s neutrality and, 
in some cases, places the court in opposition to the state.92  
 
90. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held appellate courts have jurisdiction to review 
unassigned error but has also cast doubt on the propriety of doing so. Hammock v. State, 211 S.W.3d 
874, 878 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.). 
91. See Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fifty States: Some Appellants’ Equal Protection Is More than 
Others’, 23 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 625, 662 (1996) (“[N]either the indigent defendant whose attorney does 
not file an Anders brief nor the nonindigent defendant gets this kind of review from the court.”). 
92. Eric B. Schmidt, A Call to Abandon the Anders Procedure that Allows Appointed Appellate Criminal 
Counsel to Withdraw on Grounds of Frivolity, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 199, 216–17 (2012) (arguing the Anders 
procedure produces role confusion for reviewing courts); Yee, supra note 79, at 153 (quoting State v. 
Cigic, 639 A.2d 251, 252 (N.H. 1994)) (stating the Anders procedure places “appellate court in the 
inappropriate role of defense counsel” and “the appellate court may appear to have lost its impartiality, 
displaying a potential bias in favor of any arguments it recommends”). 
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C. Variants of the Anders Procedure  
The various Anders dilemmas, and the public policy implications thereof, 
have caused some states to adopt modifications or variations of the 
procedure that aim to mediate the conflict between the right to counsel and 
the rule against frivolity.  A small minority of jurisdictions have abandoned 
the Anders procedure altogether.93  Immediately after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Anders, the American Bar Association criticized the procedure 
and discouraged counsel from withdrawing based on the rule against 
frivolity.94  Three states have modified their professional ethics rules for 
attorneys to expand the exception in the rule against frivolity to include 
appointed appellate counsel in criminal appeals.  In such circumstances, 
counsel must file a brief and raise an issue counsel believes is frivolous.  
Other states’ courts have abandoned the Anders procedure without clarifying 
their respective ethical rules against frivolity.95 
Other jurisdictions have adopted some version of the Anders procedure 
to resolve certain dilemmas.  To avoid the dilemmas created by the court’s 
independent review, some jurisdictions have modified the Anders procedure 
to require courts to independently review only those parts of the record 
necessary to address the issues appointed counsel identifies in the Anders 
brief.  This “partial independent review” modification somewhat resolves 
the conflicts created by the court in reviewing the entire record for any 
potentially meritorious issue.96  To avoid counsel’s conflict with the client, 
California has adopted a Wende97 brief procedure in which counsel files a 
brief reciting the facts and procedural history, and asks the court to conduct 
an independent review of the record.98  A similar procedure, known as a 
Balfour 99 brief, was adopted by Oregon.100  For a Balfour brief, counsel 
 
93. See Yee, supra note 79, at 155 n.82 (noting Nevada, New Hampshire, and Georgia have 
rejected Anders and amended ethical rules for lawyers).  
94. Pollis, supra note 78, at 483–84. 
95. See James E. Duggan & Andrew W. Moeller, Make Way for the ABA: Smith v. Robbins Clears 
a Path for Anders Alternatives, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 65, 67 (2001) (discussing the Idaho rule, which 
is advocated by the American Bar Association and adopted by a handful of states); see also Warner, supra 
note 91, at 642 (“Ten states have rejected the Anders procedure.”). 
96. Fazekas, supra note 83, at 590 n.67 (explaining the Ohio court’s independent review of the 
record is limited to the issues identified in counsel’s Anders brief, and arguing in support of such a 
limited independent review).  
97. People v. Wende, 600 P.2d 1071 (Cal. 1979). 
98. Id. at 1074. 
99. State v. Balfour, 814 P.2d 1069 (Or. 1991) (en banc). 
100. OR. R. APP. P. 5.90. 
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drafts a brief with the facts, procedural history, and potential points of error, 
and the pro se appellant drafts the argument portion of the brief so that 
counsel is relieved from arguing a frivolous issue.101  
Scholars and commentators have recommended other variations of the 
Anders procedure.  One scholar has recommended, for federal cases, that in 
lieu of a court’s independent review of the record, the court implement a 
three-tiered appointment system.  If the first appointed lawyer believes the 
appeal is frivolous, a second lawyer would review the case.  If the second 
lawyer reaches the same conclusion, then the court would appoint a third 
lawyer.  If all three lawyers conclude the appeal is frivolous, then the 
appellant may proceed pro se.102  Another recommendation is to limit 
Anders briefs to cases that preclude most legal issues, such as appeals from 
revocation of probation and from resentencing after limited remand when 
res judicata bars most issues.103  
D. Criticisms & Defenses of the Anders Procedure  
Evaluating criticisms and defenses of the Anders procedure requires 
weighing the extent to which different public policy considerations are 
implicated when considering, on one hand, protection of the appellant’s 
right to counsel and, on the other, avoiding frivolous issues and appeals.  
The public policy considerations discussed by critics and defenders of the 
Anders procedure include the effects of the procedure on the adversarial 
process, judicial efficiency, and public confidence in the criminal justice 
system. 
1. Effects on the Adversarial Process 
Critics and defenders of the Anders procedure have considered the effects 
of the procedure on the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system.104  
The federal and Texas state governments have established an adversarial 
justice system to promote truth-seeking.  Because the Anders procedure 
realigns the appellant, the appellant’s counsel, the court, and the state, the 
procedure breaks down the adversarial process.  Critics and defenders of the 
 
101. Id. 
102. See generally Pollis, supra note 78, at 485 (arguing for the adoption of a three-tier 
appointment system).  
103. See Yee, supra note 79, at 166 (identifying specific situations warranting an Anders brief).  
104. See Hodgkinson, supra note 88, at 56 (“A no-merit brief system allows a real breakdown of 
the adversary system.”).  
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procedure disagree about the extent to which this breakdown occurs and 
the impacts of this breakdown.  
One way the Anders procedure can impair the adversarial system is by 
depriving an indigent appellant of the assistance of counsel and 
repositioning appointed counsel in conflict with the appellant’s interests.105  
Critics argue that the filing of an Anders brief creates opposition between 
the attorney and client, when the attorney owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to 
the client.106  As a result of the Anders procedure, the appellant’s only 
recourse is to file a pro se response; but unlike counsel, pro se appellants are 
typically not legally educated, licensed, or trained.  Thus, critics contend that 
having counsel oppose an appellant’s interests and the pro se appellant’s 
subsequent lack of counsel in responding to an Anders brief, undermines the 
efficacy of the truth-seeking benefits of the adversarial process.  
Defenders of the Anders procedure argue that the appellant continues to 
have the assistance of counsel because appointed counsel must fully explain 
to the appellant, in the Anders brief, why the appeal is wholly frivolous.  
Consequently, like an appellant who can afford counsel, an indigent 
appellant receives the same type of legal advice when an appeal is wholly 
frivolous.  Defenders also note the Anders procedure requires a second-level 
review by the court, after appointed counsel files an Anders brief, and the 
court can double check counsel’s work to ensure counsel truly cannot 
ethically advocate on the appellant’s behalf in the particular appeal.107 
The Anders procedure can also impair the adversarial system by increasing 
the risk of undue prejudice to the appellant.  The Anders procedure increases 
the risk of undue prejudice by having the appellant’s lawyer affirmatively 
represent to the appellate court that the appeal has no merit.  Critics view 
such representations by counsel as extreme because the mere filing of an 
Anders brief communicates to the court that a legally educated, licensed, and 
trained criminal appellate lawyer has fully reviewed the record and 
determined the appeal is wholly frivolous and the appellant’s conviction 
 
105. See Yee, supra note 79, at 153 (“Another common criticism of the Anders procedure is that 
it leaves the indigent appellant to fend for himself on appeal and undermines advocacy in the judicial 
process.  Advocacy is said to be lost due to the forced adverse roles between the court and appellate 
attorney.”); see also Hodgkinson, supra note 88, at 56 (“When an accused’s lawyer stands up to the court 
and says, ‘My client should lose,’ no apparent advocacy on behalf of the client takes place.”). 
106. Schmidt, supra note 92, at 207. 
107. See Yee, supra note 79, at 153 (arguing the Anders procedure has checks—appointed 
counsel’s review and the court’s independent review—on the effect of counsel’s abandonment to 
ensure the appellant is not prejudiced).  
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should be affirmed.108  Even variants of the Anders procedure, such as a 
Wende brief, implicitly communicate this message to the court.  “Courts of 
appeals, including judges and staff—like most people—generally consider 
themselves exceptionally busy.”109  Courts generally (and correctly) focus 
more time deciding and resolving cases that have merit.110  So, when 
counsel flags a case as lacking merit, the mere act of doing so could cause 
the court to give less attention to the case.111   
The initial breakdown of the adversarial system—the appellant being 
deprived of counsel to respond to a motion to withdraw—can compound 
this prejudice when a pro se appellant fails to respond to counsel’s motion 
to withdraw, because they are unfamiliar with legal research and writing or 
do not believe they will be treated fairly by the justice system.112  Defenders 
of the Anders procedure respond that trust should be placed in court staff 
and judges to act fairly when acting in both roles and that statistics do not 
show courts give only a perfunctory review of Anders cases.113 
The Anders procedure can also prejudice the state when the court 
temporarily shifts into the shoes of the appellant’s advocate to identify any 
non-frivolous issues and researches whether certain issues might be 
meritorious.114  Once the appellate court identifies a non-frivolous issue 
 
108. See Fazekas, supra note 83, at 603 (stating other procedures will still put the court “on notice 
that counsel believes the appeal is wholly frivolous”); Mosley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 599, 608 (Ind. 2009) 
(“An Anders withdrawal prejudices an appellant and compromises his appeal by flagging the case as 
without merit, which invites perfunctory review by the court.”). 
109. Ritter, supra note 89, at 437.  
110. See Warner, supra note 91, at 662 (“[C]ourts with rising caseloads need to spend their 
collective time determining cases that have merit.”). 
111. See id. (“If the ultimate fairness of the proceeding is determined by the effectiveness of 
counsel in representing the defendant, then the goal should be to compel full representation through 
appeal and not to allow ways for that representation to be avoided.”). 
112. See Pollis, supra note 78, at 517 (quoting United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 
1997) (per curiam)) (“But courts nevertheless are sometimes ‘influenced’ by a defendant’s failure to 
respond, which courts construe as ‘an acknowledgment that the appeal should be abandoned as 
hopeless.’”); Hodgkinson, supra note 88, at 64 (“Regardless of one’s feelings about persons accused of 
crimes, most participants in the criminal justice system would agree that any layperson attempting to 
wind through the maze-like appellate process alone would have little chance of ever being fairly heard 
on the merits.”).  
113. Compare Andrew L. Teel, You Have the Right to an Attorney: Frivolous Appeals, Anders & 
Potential Reforms in Indiana, 63 RES GESTAE 9, 11–12 (2019) (arguing courts’ disposition statistics do not 
confirm that Anders cases invite a perfunctory review), with Hodgkinson, supra note 88, at 57–58 (“[T]he 
vast majority of no-merit appeals are dealt with quite cursorily and do not receive the attention and 
review generated by counsel who know that they will file briefs in the matters.”). 
114. See Duggan & Moeller, supra note 95, at 104 (“But the judge who is reading the record is 
not trained to think about precedent that way and may have purposely worked to de-program himself 
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and orders re-briefing by substitute counsel, confirmation bias and a desire 
to appear consistent and not to waste the court’s resources can undermine 
the court’s ability to be fair to the state when substitute counsel presents the 
issue—which the court identified—back to the court for resolution on the 
merits.115  Defenders of the Anders procedure argue this concern is real, but 
insignificant, because appellate courts rarely find such issues.116 
2. Implications for Judicial Efficiency 
Critics and defenders of the Anders procedure also disagree about the 
procedure’s efficiency.  Critics argue the procedure is less efficient than 
always requiring counsel to file a merits brief because in an ordinary appeal, 
“the court has no obligation to scrutinize” the record “in search of unraised 
issues.”117  Consequently, disposing of an Anders case can take longer for a 
court than disposing of a case with a merits brief raising a singular frivolous 
issue.118  For appointed counsel, drafting an Anders brief can often take 
roughly the same amount of time, if not more time, than filing a single-issue 
merits brief.119  The appellant is typically given time to file a pro se 
response, but the state typically files a letter waiving its right to file a brief, 
saving the court the time of waiting for the state’s brief.  However, when a 
pro se appellant files a response to counsel’s motion to withdraw, the state 
may file a responsive brief.  Because the court must appoint new counsel, 
critics contend the Anders procedure is incredibly inefficient because it 
effectively requires a delay equal to the time from when the first appointed 
 
of this method of thinking when he moved from the bar to the bench.”); Duggan & Moeller, supra 
note 95, at 105 (“Moreover, the judge who must review the record and cull out meritorious issues must 
later decide the issues.  The same court must then switch back to its neutral role and declare whether 
the issue which it found to be meritorious merits reversal.”). 
115. Duggan & Moeller, supra note 95, at 104–05. 
116. See Fazekas, supra note 83, at 602 (arguing courts do not always find a non-frivolous issue 
when counsel files an Anders brief). 
117. Pollis, supra note 78, at 507; Hodgkinson, supra note 88, at 59–60. 
118. See Ramos v. State, 944 P.2d 856, 857 (Nev. 1997) (“[T]the Anders procedure often entails 
the expenditure of more court resources than would be expended upon a meritorious appeal.”); see also 
Yee, supra note 79, at 151–52 (“The procedure has been characterized as administratively difficult 
because it allegedly takes more time, work, and resources than an appeal briefed on the merits in the 
ordinary course.”). 
119. Mosley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 599, 607 (Ind. 2009); see Joseph Frueh, The Anders Brief in 
Appeals from Civil Commitment, 118 YALE L.J. 272, 313 (2008) (noting “the added time and expense to 
compile a scrupulous Anders brief”). 
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counsel starts drafting the Anders brief to the time that substitute counsel 
starts drafting a brief on the merits.120 
Defenders respond that Anders is more efficient than filing a frivolous 
merits brief because, with a merits brief: (1) the state must spend its time 
responding to the merits; (2) the court must grant or consider granting oral 
argument; and (3) the court must review the entire record.121  Other 
commentators have noted that in response to a survey, judges and court 
staff reported that Anders cases take the same amount of time, or less, than 
cases briefed on the merits.122  
3. Confidence in the Criminal Justice System  
Finally, critics and defenders of the Anders procedure disagree as to 
whether the procedure promotes or hinders confidence in the criminal 
justice system.123  Critics argue the Anders procedure fosters a disrespect 
for the criminal justice system and constitutional rights.124  Initially, the 
procedure results in the abandonment of an indigent appellant as “a direct 
function of the [appellant’s] poverty.”125  Because the Anders procedure is 
not employed when an appellant can afford to retain counsel, the public 
nature of appointed counsel’s abandonment of an appellant is caused by the 
appellant’s indigence.  “A system where a lawyer remains as the defendant’s 
 
120. Mosley, 908 N.E.2d at 607. 
121. See Fazekas, supra note 83, at 599–600 (arguing Anders is more efficient than requiring a 
merits brief because oral argument is mandatory in Ohio; the state must file a responsive brief; 
sufficiency issues require the court and the state’s attorney to read the entire record, sometimes in 
lengthy trials; and both sides must file and the court must read lengthy briefs because the state would 
not want to lose its conviction); Yee, supra note 79, at 154 (noting frivolous issues waste “both the 
judiciary’s time and the taxpayer’s money”). 
122. Teel, supra note 113, at 12 (arguing survey results show Anders cases take the same amount 
of time or less than a case briefed on the merits); Yee, supra note 79, at 165–66 (“There is significant 
disagreement among appellate attorneys as to whether the Anders procedure requires more time, energy, 
work and resources for the judiciary and appellate attorneys who adjudicate and prepare Anders 
briefs.”); Frederick D. Junkin, Note, The Right to Counsel in “Frivolous” Criminal Appeals: A Reevaluation of 
the Guarantees of Anders v. California, 67 TEX. L. REV. 181, 187 (1988) (“Anders provides a just and 
efficient process for protecting the indigents’ right to appellate representation.”). 
123. See Hodgkinson, supra note 88, at 64 (“If I file a no-merit brief, I think all that the client 
and society see is an attorney who gave up on his client.”). 
124. E.g., id. at 55 (arguing the fracturing of the attorney/defendant relationship due to no-merit 
briefs). 
125. See Pollis, supra note 78, at 516 (“[W]e should be very concerned about the troubling 
repercussions of the Anders apparatus from the perspective of the client.”); see also id. at 517 (“It is 
beyond dispute that the abandonment is a direct function of the defendant’s poverty.”). 
  
2021] Resolving the Anders Dilemmas 117 
advocate will undoubtedly result in less dissatisfaction,”126 which can be 
beneficial for rehabilitation.127  Conversely, the Anders procedure requires 
client-abandonment and therefore “does not bode well for the reputation 
of the criminal justice system.”128 
Conversely, defenders of the Anders procedure contend the procedure 
promotes respect for the criminal justice system by eliminating counsel’s 
role in advancing frivolous appeals.  Counsel appointed to represent 
indigent appellants are paid by taxpayers.  Consequently, when appointed 
counsel files a merits brief raising a frivolous issue, taxpayer dollars are being 
used to advance frivolous appeals.  Frivolous proceedings, generally, waste 
public resources by requiring courts to spend time on proceedings that 
should not exist.  Thus, defenders of the Anders procedure contend Anders 
is a necessary public stance against abuse of the criminal justice system.  
4. Conclusion 
The Anders procedure, and its variants, critics, and defenders, all have 
some merit, but this debate suffers from a lack of context-specific data.  
There are many different types of procedural postures presented in criminal 
appeals in Texas, including appeals following: (1) an open plea of guilty; (2) a 
probation revocation; (3) a plea bargain with and without issues preserved 
by a written motion; (4) a bench trial; (5) a jury trial; and (6) resentencing.  
The legal issues in each can differ dramatically, making it difficult to 
categorically treat all criminal appeals the same when considering the 
advantages and disadvantages of the Anders procedure.   
Weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the Anders procedure is 
further complicated by the different variations and permutations in how 
criminal appeals may proceed.  An appeal may be, in actuality, meritorious; 
non-meritorious, but non-frivolous; or wholly frivolous.  In each of these 
categories of cases, counsel might file a merits brief or (correctly or 
incorrectly) an Anders brief and motion to withdraw.  A pro se appellant 
 
126. See Duggan & Moeller, supra note 95, at 101 (“To the individual defendant, the mere fact 
that his lawyer does not withdraw midway through the appeal may improve the quality of the 
representation.”). 
127. See Frueh, supra note 119, at 308–09 (noting under the “therapeutic justice” school of 
thought, negative perceptions of judicial procedures “can potentially hinder their progress under 
traditional mental-health therapies and treatment”). 
128. See Pollis, supra note 78, at 517 (“The premise of the Anders procedure is to protect a 
criminal defendant’s constitutional rights, but defendants are unlikely to view it that way when it results 
in abandonment.”). 
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might file a pro se response to counsel’s motion, or the appellant might not.  
Depending upon the court’s assessment of the Anders brief, the court might 
grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the conviction, or the court might 
identify an issue and order merits briefing by substitute counsel.  Weighing 
the advantages and disadvantages of the Anders procedure is challenging 
without more precise data, but experience can inform determinations about 
which situations occur more often than others. 
Additionally, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the Anders 
procedure, especially on the issue of judicial efficiency, is even further 
complicated by the national variations in state court practices and 
procedures.  Such variations in procedure include whether oral argument is 
mandatory in each case briefed on the merits; whether an appellate court 
must issue a full opinion or may dispose of appeals summarily; how courts 
handle deficient Anders briefs; status of courts’ training on the Anders 
procedure; whether authoring justices rely on staff attorneys’ reviews of 
records or personally review the record; and whether non-authoring panel 
justices rely on staff attorneys’ or the authoring justice’s review of the 
record.129  The remainder of this Article considers the defenses, criticisms, 
and variants of Anders in light of the specific procedures in Texas appellate 
courts. 
VI.    HOW & WHY TEXAS SHOULD ABANDON THE ANDERS PROCEDURE 
Texas should abandon the Anders procedure.  The Anders procedure is 
necessitated by rule 3.01’s prohibition against asserting frivolous issues on 
appeal.130  The exception to rule 3.01—which permits criminal defense 
lawyers at trial to frivolously defend a client, so long as the defense is limited 
 
129. See Fazekas, supra note 83, at 599 (explaining Ohio’s mandatory rule for oral argument in 
every case briefed on the merits makes the Anders procedure more inefficient); Joel M. Schumm, 
Mosley Works for Courts, Public Defenders and Criminal Defendants, 63 RES GESTAE 17, 17 (2019) (noting 
courts “can assess a well-briefed, straightforward appeal in a matter of minutes”); Pollis, supra note 78, 
at 507 (quoting Warner, supra note 91, at 656) (noting the “lack of uniformity in internal court methods 
for handling Anders briefs” and the “lack of guidance and uniformity on how to respond to a deficient 
Anders brief”); Duggan & Moeller, supra note 95, at 104 (stating, “[w]hether the ABA approach . . . is 
more efficient may depend on local practice[,]” and identifying factors such as the “availability of 
personnel to read the record[,]” and whether the court must issue “an opinion in every case or” 
summarily dispose of an appeal).  Another possible variation is how courts handle merits briefs that 
challenge the imposition of fees, but do not challenge the conviction or sentence. See, e.g., Allison v. 
State, 609 S.W.3d 614, 626 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020, no pet.) (requiring the filing of an Anders brief 
when counsel filed a merits brief challenging the imposition of fees).  
130. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A; In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 
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to requiring the prosecution to establish all elements of the case beyond a 
reasonable doubt—should be narrowly expanded to allow appointed 
appellate counsel to assert an issue in support of an indigent client’s 
appeal.131  In the interests of safeguarding other fundamental constitutional 
rights, the exception to rule 3.01 should also be narrowly expanded to apply 
to any appellate proceeding in which an indigent defendant has the right to 
appointed counsel (e.g., juvenile delinquency, civil commitment, 
termination of parental rights), regardless of whether that right is provided 
for by constitution or statute.  By narrowly expanding the exception to 
rule 3.01, appointed counsel would no longer have a basis to withdraw from 
representation on the ground that continued representation would require 
counsel to breach their ethical duty not to assert a frivolous issue.132  
Narrowly expanding the existing exception in rule 3.01 would entirely 
obviate the need for the Anders procedure in any appeal in which counsel is 
appointed. Considering Texas appellate courts’ practices and procedures, 
abandoning the Anders procedure would be more advantageous than 
disadvantageous in terms of maintaining the truth-seeking function of the 
adversarial system; reducing judicial inefficiencies; protecting indigent 
appellants’ right to counsel; and promoting confidence in the criminal justice 
system.133 
A. The Relatively Unexamined Basis for the Anders Procedure in Texas 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals first applied Anders in a cursory 
opinion in Currie v. State134 in 1974.  Without any apparent consideration 
that the Anders procedure might be optional, the Court of Criminal Appeals 
noted “Anders should not be interpreted as requiring appointed counsel to 
make arguments he would not consider worthy of inclusion in a brief for a 
paying client or to urge reversal if in fact he can find no merit in the 
appeal.”135  The Court of Criminal Appeals continued to require 
 
131. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R 3.01 cmt. 3. 
132. For civil appeals with the right to appointed counsel, amendments to the Texas Rules of 
Appellate Procedure may be required to ensure an indigent appellant or appointed counsel is exempt 
from damages caused by a frivolous appeal. See, e.g., TEX. R. APP. P. 45, 62 (providing damages for 
frivolous civil appeals).  
133. Hodgkinson, supra note 88, at 64 (arguing “the justification for a no-merit brief system 
simply does not nearly outweigh the associated costs”). 
134. Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
135. Id. at 684.  
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compliance with the Anders procedure without much discussion until its 
decision in In re Schulman.136 
In In re Schulman, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected alternatives to 
the Anders procedure when appointed counsel filed an Anders brief without 
a motion to withdraw.137  The court noted appointed counsel’s argument 
that the Texas courts of appeals were inconsistent in applying the Anders 
procedure, including requesting the court below that the court should 
“abandon its ‘policy’ of requiring an attorney who files an Anders brief to 
simultaneously file a motion to withdraw as counsel.”138  Appointed 
counsel argued the motion to withdraw contradicted counsel’s moral and 
ethical duties to the client, and that the procedure articulated in Anders was 
merely dicta.139   
The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected appointed counsel’s argument 
that the Anders procedure was merely dicta: 
We are unable to find any authority from any jurisdiction for the proposition 
that the Supreme Court’s discussion of the requirement that counsel file a 
motion to withdraw is mere obiter dicta. Instead, in Smith v. Robbins, the 
Supreme Court drew back from the proposition that the Anders brief 
procedure was a constitutional requirement. It concluded that [t]he procedure 
we sketched in Anders is a prophylactic one; the [s]tates are free to adopt 
different procedures, so long as those procedures adequately safeguard a 
defendant’s right to appellate counsel.140 
The court stated the Anders procedure, “though not required by the federal 
[C]onstitution, seems to work relatively well in Texas.  We see no reason to 
change it at this time.”141  The court’s analysis of this issue was relatively 
cursory, and addressed neither the scholarships discussing the Anders 
dilemmas nor the criticisms or defenses of the Anders procedure.142  The 
court then punted the decision to adopt a different procedure to the Texas 
 
136. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 
137. Id. at 404. 
138. Id. at 405.  
139. Id. at 410. 
140. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 280–84 
(2000)).  
141. Id. (footnote omitted). 
142. Id. 
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Legislature and concluded that “in the meantime, we will continue to adhere 
to the original rationale and procedural guidelines set out in Anders.”143   
The rationale in In re Schulman for maintaining the Anders procedure 
primarily focused on counsel’s professional and ethical duty to not assert 
frivolous issues.144  The court explained an “attorney’s duty to withdraw is 
based upon his professional and ethical responsibilities as an officer of the 
court not to burden the judicial system with false claims, frivolous pleadings, 
or burdensome time demands.”145  The court also reasoned that an Anders 
brief assures “the appellate court that the attorney has indeed made a 
thorough and conscientious examination of the record, has provided the 
appellate court with the appropriate facts of the case and its procedural 
history, and has pointed out any potentially plausible points of error.”146  
The court noted the Anders procedure “has an additional use for the 
defendant: it provides him with appropriate citations to the record if he 
wishes to exercise his right to file a pro se brief.”147  And, the court noted 
the procedure “has an additional use for the appointed attorney: it protects 
him from the constantly increasing charge that he was ineffective and had 
not handled the case with that diligence to which an indigent defendant is 
entitled.”148 
Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals identified the benefits of 
the Anders procedures and the purposes of the procedure’s features in In re 
Schulman, the court did not expressly consider any of the drawbacks of the 
various Anders dilemmas or whether other alternatives might be 
preferable.149  The court punted the public policy considerations to the 
legislature, despite having the purview under Smith v. Robbins150 to adopt an 
alternative, as other states’ courts had done.151  The court has not revisited 
the propriety of the Anders procedure since In re Schulman.  However, the 
Supreme Court of Texas and Texas’s intermediate courts of appeals, without 
considering any alternatives, have required appointed counsel to follow the 




145. Id. at 407.  
146. Id. at 406.  
147. Id. at 407–08.   
148. Id. at 408 (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 745 (1967)). 
149. Id. at 410. 
150. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000). 
151. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 410; Warner, supra note 91, at 657. 
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counsel when counsel concludes the appeal is wholly frivolous.152  So, in 
most, if not all, civil appeals in which counsel is appointed to a client with 
the right to appeal (including juvenile, parental termination, and civil 
commitment appeals), counsel is expected to follow the Anders 
procedure.153 
B. Practices & Procedures in Texas Appellate Courts  
The weighing of the advantages and disadvantages of the Anders 
procedure in Texas first requires identifying state court practices and 
procedures affecting such an analysis.  In Texas, appellate counsel is typically 
appointed from among criminal defense lawyers in private practice and 
public defenders’ offices, and larger counties that generate more appeals 
typically have appellate divisions in their district attorneys’ offices to file 
responsive briefs in criminal appeals.154  A criminal appeal begins by the 
defendant filing a notice of appeal.155  When the defendant is indigent, the 
trial court must appoint appellate counsel and the trial court clerk and court 
reporter must prepare the appellate record, all at a cost to taxpayers.156   
In disposing of appeals, Texas appellate courts must issue an opinion; a 
court may issue a shorter memorandum opinion, but a memorandum 
opinion must nevertheless provide the basic reasons for the court’s 
decision.157  In regular appeals, appointed counsel will file a merits brief, 
and the state will file a response brief.158  Infrequently, appointed counsel 
will file a reply brief.159  The appellate court typically sets the case for 
submission on briefs but has discretion to decide whether to hear an oral 
argument.160  In the vast majority of criminal appeals briefed on the merits, 
appellate courts decide the case without oral argument, even when one or 
both parties request an oral argument. 
 
152. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 410. 
153. Id. 
154. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04 (providing procedures for appointing 
counsel); see also Appellate Division, BEXAR CNTY., https://www.bexar.org/1745/Appellate-Division 
[https://perma.cc/UVL6-R4RH] (last visited Aug. 28, 2021) (describing the appellate division of the 
Bexar County District Attorney’s Office).  
155. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2.   
156. Id. at R. 20.1, 20.2, 26.04.  
157. Id. at R. 47.1, 47.4.   
158. See id. at R. 38.1, 38.2 (outlining the requirements of what should be included in an appellant 
and appellee’s brief).   
159. Id. at R. 38.3.  
160. Id. at R. 39.1.  
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Generally, in Anders appeals, appointed counsel files a motion to 
withdraw supported by an Anders brief.161  Some courts of appeals have a 
checklist and guidelines for counsel to use when filing an Anders brief, but 
most do not.162  The state typically files a brief waiver letter, declining to 
file a response to the motion to withdraw.  The court will then give the pro 
se appellant an opportunity to respond to the Anders brief.  Pro se appellants 
can file responses, but they do not in a large percentage of cases.  When pro 
se appellants file a response to counsel’s motion to withdraw, the state will 
often file a brief responding to the pro se response.163  Typically, a staff 
attorney will conduct an independent review of the record.164  If properly 
trained, the reviewing staff attorney will review the entire record, not merely 
the parts of the record cited by appointed counsel in the Anders brief.165 
Very few intermediate appellate court justices and staff attorneys have an 
extensive background or significant experience with criminal appeals.  
Currently, three of approximately two hundred staff attorneys at 
intermediate appellate courts are board certified in criminal appellate law; 
zero of over eighty justices are board certified in criminal appellate law; zero 
staff attorneys are board certified in criminal law; and two justices are board 
certified in criminal law.  Some appellate courts do not offer formal training 
for staff attorneys or judges to handle Anders cases and independently review 
records in criminal appeals.  Oftentimes, neither the authoring justice nor 
the other panel justices independently review the record because they rely 
on the review conducted by the staff attorney.  Also notable is that Texas’s 
appellate court justices are elected, unless appointed to temporarily fill an 
unexpired term.166  
C. Amending TDRPC Rule 3.01  
Considering Texas’s practices and procedures in criminal appeals, Texas 
should follow the jurisdictions that have amended their disciplinary rules to 
 
161. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).   
162. E.g., Practice Before the Court: Anders Guidelines & Forms, TEX. JUD. BRANCH, 
www.txcourts.gov/1stcoa/practice-before-the-court/anders-guidelines-forms [https://perma.cc/K8 
QZ-ZMDT] (containing links to Anders guidelines and forms). 
163. E.g., Zuniga v. State, No. 04-17-00058-CR, 2018 WL 3551189, at *1 (Tex. App.— 
San Antonio July 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (summarizing the state’s 
response to a pro se brief). 
164. Id. 
165. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 407 (requiring an independent court review of the entire 
record).  
166. TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 6, 11. 
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permit appellate counsel to assert a frivolous issue.  Texas could abandon 
the Anders procedures by amending TDRPC 3.01’s rule against frivolity and 
narrowly expanding the existing exception for criminal defense counsel to 
all cases in which counsel represents a person who has the right to appointed 
counsel.167  Specifically, the text of the rule itself, or comment 3, could be 
modified to specify that counsel representing a party with the right to 
counsel on appeal may not withdraw on the grounds that the appeal is 
frivolous.168  Stated differently, the constitutional or statutory right to 
appellate counsel would take precedence over counsel’s rule-based duty not 
to assert frivolous issues, and the right to counsel would always prohibit 
withdrawal based solely on the rule against frivolity.169  Although the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals punted the decision of whether to change Anders 
to the Texas Legislature, Texas courts have the prerogative to abandon 
Anders without legislative direction.  And, if the Texas Legislature 
disapproved, the legislature could either require the Anders procedure or 
limit the statutory rights to appeal, and thereby limit the corresponding right 
to assistance of counsel on appeal.  
Such an amendment to rule 3.01 would still leave intact counsel’s 
candidness obligations under rule 3.03.170  Specifically, if appointed 
appellate counsel raised a frivolous issue that was clearly foreclosed by 
precedent, counsel would remain obliged to disclose the precedent to the 
court.171  As explained more fully below, rule 3.03 would therefore function 
to assist courts in quickly and efficiently disposing of the frivolous issue on 
appeal by directing the court to the sole authority it needs to draft an opinion 
briefly disposing of the appeal.  Although disclosing contrary authority 
might also suggest to the court that counsel believes the appeal is wholly 
frivolous, appellate counsel occasionally discloses such authority under 
 
167. See Pollis, supra note 78, at 506 (“One appellate judge advocates amending the rules of 
professional conduct to clarify that a merits brief in a criminal appeal is never frivolous.”). In fairness, 
this exception would apply to attorneys retained by non-indigent clients.  
168. But see Schumm, supra note 129, at 17 (arguing rule 3.1’s exception “surely extends to 
appellate counsel bringing a sufficiency-of-evidence challenge”); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 407 
(showing the court of criminal appeals appeared to believe counsel may not ethically file a merits brief 
asserting an issue counsel believes is frivolous). 
169. See Junkin, supra note 122, at 192 (“Others suggest that the Court should interpret the 
constitutional right to the assistance of appellate counsel as absolutely prohibiting withdrawal.”).  
170. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.03, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A; Schumm, supra note 129, at 17 (“Filing a compliant brief that discloses 
adverse authority ensures counsel will face no discipline for a lack of candor to the tribunal.”). 
171. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.03. 
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rule 3.03 when they file briefs on the merits, which is not necessarily an 
admission that counsel believes the appeal is frivolous.172 
D. Advantages of Texas Abandoning the Anders Procedure 
Abandoning the Anders procedure by amending TDRPC rule 3.01 would 
have several benefits.  Abandoning the Anders procedure would allow Texas 
to promote the integrity of indigent defendants’ right to counsel on 
appeal.173  Abandoning the Anders procedure would also reduce judicial 
inefficiencies, conserve public resources, and promote other important 
public policy goals.174 
1. Protecting the Integrity of the Right to Counsel 
Abandoning the Anders procedure in Texas would protect the integrity of 
the right to counsel in several ways.  Most obviously, abandoning the Anders 
procedure would ensure that the indigent appellant is not deprived of 
counsel mid-appeal.  One of the dilemmas created by the Anders procedure 
is that appointed appellate counsel must argue against the merits of a client’s 
case before counsel is permitted to withdraw.  This dilemma undermines 
the integrity of the right to counsel.  First, when an indigent appellant’s 
appointed counsel files an Anders brief arguing to an appellate court why the 
appellant should lose on appeal, counsel’s conduct is not “assistance”; it is 
antithesis of assistance, it is opposition.  The Anders procedure “sets up a 
system in which an accused, with little recourse, does not even get an 
adequate review of his or her conviction.”175  Second, this Anders dilemma 
requires the indigent appellant to argue—without the assistance of 
counsel—why a legally educated, Texas-licensed, and presumptively-
competent criminal appellate lawyer is incorrect not only about the merits 
of the appeal, but also about counsel’s self-assessment of their professional–
ethical obligations.176  And third, the Anders procedure undermines the 
 
172. But see Pollis, supra note 78, at 506 (arguing the candor rule requiring disclosure of contrary 
authority “would not resolve the holistic problem” because disclosing contrary authority “to the court 
may be just as problematic as characterizing the appeal as frivolous”).  
173. Warner, supra note 91, at 665.   
174. Id. (“A change in the rules of professional conduct as well as the adoption of the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Appeals would facilitate both the protection of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel and the smooth functioning of the appellate court.”). 
175. See Hodgkinson, supra note 88, at 60 (explaining the problem with a no-merit brief 
procedure).  
176. Id. at 56 (“But the appellate court is called upon to make this determination without the 
assistance of counsel.”).  
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attorney–client relationship by forcing appointed counsel to publicly 
disclose mental impressions and work product produced on behalf of the 
client.  “This rule stands in stark contrast to protection we normally afford 
to a lawyer’s sacrosanct mental impressions.”177   
Moreover, narrowly expanding the existing exception in rule 3.01 would 
eliminate rule 3.01’s glaring double standard for criminal cases that go to 
trial.  When an indigent client’s right to appointed counsel conflicts with 
counsel’s ethical duty not to assert frivolous issues, rule 3.01 requires a 
different resolution depending upon whether counsel was appointed for 
trial, or for an appeal.178  Appointed trial counsel may frivolously argue the 
state failed to satisfy its burden to establish all elements of the charged 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt without fear of disciplinary action; 
appointed appellate counsel may not argue this same point, even for the 
same client in the same case on the same evidentiary record.179  Either the 
integrity of the right to appointed counsel is more important than having 
counsel assert a frivolous issue regarding the sufficiency the evidence, or it 
is not. Texas and other jurisdictions have recognized that, for trial 
proceedings, the integrity of the right to appointed counsel is sufficiently 
important to require counsel, in some cases, to frivolously argue the state 
failed to meet its burden.180  The same standard should apply to appointed 
appellate counsel.   
There are certainly differences between trial counsel arguing the 
insufficiency of evidence to a factfinder as matter of establishing the facts, 
and arguing the insufficiency of the evidence to a court as a matter of law.181  
At trial, a factfinder is able to observe the demeanor, tone, and nonverbal 
cues of witnesses, whereas an appellate court cannot do the same on a cold 
record; and, objective legal standards govern whether the evidence admitted 
at trial is sufficient to support the judgment, whereas there are no similar 
objective standards for a factfinder in criminal cases.182  But such 
considerations in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence are legally 
constructed fictions in Texas criminal cases, necessitated by constitutional 
 
177. Pollis, supra note 78, at 507. 
178. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A. 
179. Hodgkinson, supra note 88, at 61. 
180. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01.   
181. See McCoy v. Ct. of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1988) (explaining a criminal 
appellant has lost the presumption of innocence). 
182. Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 663, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
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rights specific to criminal prosecutions.  These fictions do not exist in Texas 
civil cases when undisputed facts and evidence establish the existence or 
absence of civil liability as a matter of law.183  In other words, when 
appointed counsel frivolously argues that a jury—or the court in a bench 
trial—should find the defendant not guilty, even when no rational factfinder 
would find the defendant not guilty, counsel is not merely arguing the 
factfinder should ignore the evidence, counsel is implicitly encouraging the 
factfinder to nullify the law applicable to the undisputed facts of the case.184  
Thus, when appointed trial counsel argues the prosecution failed to meet its 
burden without a good-faith factual basis for doing so, the argument is 
sufficiently analogous to a frivolous legal argument.185  Thus, rule 3.01’s 
existing exception for appointed trial counsel countenances some frivolous 
legal arguments that encourage jurors to disregard the law.186   
Because the harm caused by a frivolous appellate argument is not 
significantly greater than a frivolous trial argument, a double standard for 
the different treatment of the right to appointed counsel at trial and on 
appeal would be justified only if the right to appointed appellate counsel is 
less valuable than the right to appointed trial counsel.187  Certainly, from 
the defendant’s perspective, having counsel appointed to obtain a favorable 
jury verdict—which definitively ends the prospect of any future prosecution 
by the same prosecutorial entity for the same offense—is more important 
than obtaining a reversal on appeal, which may result in a new trial or in an 
appellate judgment of acquittal that is later reversed by a higher court.  But 
in the exceedingly rare case that appointed trial counsel is unable to make a 
 
183. See generally City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005) (establishing the legal 
sufficiency standard for civil cases in which testimony provided by interested witness may conclusively 
establish the underlying facts of a case, and legal sufficiency may be raised by either the plaintiff or 
defense in an appeal). 
184. See Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“If there is no disputed 
factual issue, the legality of the conduct is determined by the trial judge alone, as a question of law.”)  
Arguing that a jury should disregard undisputed facts and how the law applies to those facts is, in effect, 
seeking jury nullification.  
185. See Hodgkinson, supra note 88, at 62 (“But this view of trial counsel’s role is simply not 
consistent with the idea of zealous representation or the model rule.”) 
186. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A. 
187. Compare McCoy v. Ct. of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1988) (noting on appeal, 
the appellant no longer has the presumption of innocence) with Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 
(1987) (stating the right to appeal gives rise to the right to appointed counsel for the appeal and 
indicating the right to counsel on appeal is necessary to ensure the presumption of innocence was 
actually rebutted by legally sufficient evidence).  
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good-faith argument that the state has not satisfied its burden of proof, and 
no rational jury would find the defendant not guilty based on the undisputed 
facts and evidence, then the right to appointed trial counsel could aid in 
producing an injustice.  More broadly, the right to appointed trial counsel 
and the right to appointed appellate counsel are of comparable importance 
because excluding arguments to a jury at trial or to a court at a pretrial 
hearing about the existence or absence of certain facts, trial counsel’s 
defenses and issues in the trial court are—like the arguments of appellate 
counsel—legal arguments.   
Abandoning Anders would better protect indigent appellants’ right to 
counsel on appeal because both appointed counsel and appellate courts 
sometimes err in determining whether an appeal is wholly frivolous.188  In 
theory, under the Anders procedure, counsel will identify all possible issues 
and explain why they lack merit.189  But in practice, in far too many cases, 
appointed appellate counsel will file an Anders briefs that does not identify 
all potential issues in the record or incorrectly argues an identified issue is 
wholly frivolous.  As a failsafe, the Anders procedure requires the appellate 
court to independently review the record.190  In theory, the appellate court 
has or will acquire an in-depth, comprehensive working knowledge of 
substantive and procedural criminal trial and appellate law.  But in Texas 
courts, that is simply not the case.  In Texas, appellate court justices, and 
their staff attorneys, often draw upon the strengths of their varied 
backgrounds; but many have never practiced criminal law or handled a 
criminal appeal.  Very few appellate court justices and staff attorneys in 
Texas courts of appeals are board certified in criminal law or criminal 
appellate law.  Many appellate courts do not have guidelines for counsel, or 
their staff, to use in conducting an independent review of the record.  And 
sometimes, staff attorneys are not trained in how to conduct an independent 
review of the record in criminal cases and, as in other cases, simply rely on 
the parties’ briefs to be fully comprehensive.  Thus, the Anders procedure in 
Texas incorrectly assumes Texas’s appellate judiciary and staff are 
universally experts in independently evaluating a record in a criminal appeal 
for non-frivolous issues.   
 
188. See, e.g., Harber v. State, 594 S.W.3d 438, 438 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, pet. 
ref’d) (reversing manslaughter conviction and rendering an acquittal after appointed counsel, who was 
later elected a district court judge, filed an Anders brief).   
189. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967). 
190. Id. 
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Furthermore, the Anders procedure diminishes the truth-seeking benefits 
of the right to counsel and of Texas’s adversarial criminal justice system.191  
When an indigent appellant’s lawyer files an Anders brief arguing the appeal 
is frivolous, an Anders brief impresses upon the appellate court that even the 
appellant’s zealous advocate believes the appellant’s conviction should be 
affirmed.  In the vast majority of the cases, the state files a form letter 
waiving its opportunity to respond.  The appellate court must then rely on 
a pro se appellant, who usually lacks the education, licensing, training, and 
experience of a lawyer, to explain why their educated, licensed, trained, and 
experienced lawyer is incorrect.  In many cases, the pro se appellant does 
not file a brief, and the sole analysis of the potential issues in the appeal is 
one-sided, and presented by the appellant’s advocate, against the appellant.  
Given a general lack of criminal defense and criminal appellate experience 
by justices and court staff, Texas’s appellate courts are accustomed to relying 
on the competence and expertise of counsel to educate the court on the 
legal issues and on the adversarial process to identify defects in briefed 
arguments.  The adversarial system is premised upon each side advancing 
the best arguments in opposition to the other side; the right to counsel on 
appeal is intended to ensure the efficacy of this adversarial process in 
reducing wrongful convictions.  The Anders procedure breaks down the 
adversarial system in Texas and thereby undermines the truth-seeking 
benefits of the right to counsel.192   
2. Conserving Public Resources 
Abandoning the Anders procedure would allow Texas courts to better 
conserve public resources.  First, abandoning the Anders procedure would, 
when the first appointed appellate counsel is incorrect about the appeal 
being wholly frivolous, avoid taxpayers having to pay for two different 
appointed attorneys to separately review the merits of the same appeal.193  
When an indigent appellant has appointed counsel, taxpayers of the county 
pay for the appointment of counsel.  And when a court disagrees with 
counsel’s Anders brief and remands the case for appointment of new counsel 
to brief the issue identified by the court, taxpayers pay twice.  
 
191. See generally Hodgkinson, supra note 88, at 55 (explaining how the Anders procedure breaks 
down the adversarial system).  
192. Id.  
193. See, e.g., Harber v. State, No. 04-17-00595-CR, 2018 WL 5268859, at *1 (Tex. App.— 
San Antonio Oct. 24, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (identifying an arguable 
issue and ordering substitute counsel to re-brief the case). 
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Second, abandoning the Anders procedure would allow Texas appellate 
courts and appointed counsel to quickly and efficiently dispose of frivolous 
appeals. As far as appellate procedures go, the Anders procedure is relatively 
complex; the procedure contains multiple steps not required in an appeal in 
which a merits brief is filed.194  Counsel ordinarily must file a motion to 
withdraw.195  The Anders brief must contain a professional evaluation of 
the whole record, with cites to the record and relevant legal authorities, that 
rebuffs every single potential issue that could be raised on appeal.196  
Counsel must also notify the appellant of the filing of the motion to 
withdraw and supporting Anders brief, explain the process to the appellant, 
and advise the appellant of the right to obtain and review a copy of the 
record and to file a pro se brief in response to the motion.197  When an 
Anders brief is filed, the appellate court must ensure counsel has properly 
followed these procedures.198  Occasionally, when counsel fails to follow 
these procedures, the appellate court must delay the final disposition of the 
case by ordering counsel to remedy counsel’s noncompliance.199   
After appointed counsel properly follows the Anders procedure, and the 
state and pro se appellant file a response (if any), the burden shifts to the 
appellate court.200  In reviewing counsel’s Anders brief, the appellate court 
must determine whether counsel correctly determined that the arguable 
issues identified by counsel are truly frivolous.201  Even when the court 
determines counsel is correct in determining the identified arguable issues 
are frivolous, the court must then review the entire record for any arguable 
issues counsel did not identify in the Anders brief.202  If the court finds such 
an arguable issue, the court must decide whether to delay the case by 
ordering counsel to file a supplemental Anders brief.203  Alternatively, the 
court must conduct its own research and analysis to determine whether the 
arguable issue, if raised, would be frivolous.204  When conducted properly 
and thoroughly, the court’s independent review of the record can be 
 
194. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 
195. Id. at 406–07. 
196. Id. at 407. 
197. Id. at 407–08. 
198. Id. at 409; Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 
199. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 407; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318–21. 
200. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.   
201. Id.   
202. Id.  
203. Id. at 411.  
204. Id. at 409. 
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incredibly time-consuming in many cases.  While some staff attorneys 
believe that writing a form Anders opinion takes the same amount of time, 
if not less time, than an opinion addressing a single frivolous issue, it is also 
possible—given the lack of clarity in and reasonable disagreements about 
the Anders procedures—that the staff attorneys are not properly following 
the Anders procedure or are overlooking arguable issues.205  If the court 
disagrees with counsel’s Anders brief, the court must further delay the final 
disposition of the appeal by abating the appeal and remanding the case to 
the trial court for appointment of new appellate counsel who must then 
restart the entire record-review and briefing processes.206  For an appellate 
procedure in Texas, this process is long, detailed, and inefficient.   
Moreover, the appellate court’s determination as to whether an Anders 
brief correctly concludes the appeal is wholly frivolous is often encumbered 
by one of the Anders dilemmas: whether the arguable issues identified by 
counsel must merely lack merit or whether the arguable issues—even if 
meritless—are frivolous.  When a court reviews an Anders brief, the court’s 
determination is not whether the judgment of conviction should be affirmed 
or reversed.  The Anders procedure requires the court to determine both that 
the potential issues are both meritless and that counsel could also be 
disciplined by the state bar for violating rule 3.01 by asserting an issue that 
is wholly frivolous, due to counsel lacking a good-faith basis for asserting 
the issues or arguing for a modification, extension, or reversal of existing 
law.207  There are cases in which a judge or staff attorney will identify a 
non-frivolous issue, but it appears the issue would appear to lack merit if 
decided by the court.  In such cases, the court knows that abating the appeal 
and remanding for appointment of new counsel is costly in terms of time 
and money and will not change the ultimate result for the appellant.  This 
conflict has created disagreements among Texas appellate court justices 
about whether to strictly apply Anders or to avoid a clear waste of judicial 
resources by not following Anders.  Thus, the conflict between following the 
letter of the law and commitment to the right of counsel, even when 
 
205. Teel, supra note 113, at 12 (arguing survey results show Anders cases take the same or less 
amount of time than a case briefed on the merits).   
206. E.g., Zuniga v. State, No. 04-17-00058-CR, 2018 WL 3551189, at *1 (Tex. App.— 
San Antonio July 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 
207. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert 
an issue therein, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that there is a basis for doing so that is not 
frivolous.”).  
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inefficient, and a more efficient administration of justice, when the outcome 
will ultimately be the same for the appellant, is very real.208  The 
disagreements among Texas appellate court justices can further add to the 
time required to dispose of Anders appeals and result in inconsistent results 
for appellants.   
Allowing appointed appellate counsel to argue a single frivolous issue, in 
lieu of filing an Anders brief, would require the use of public resources, but 
would likely require using fewer resources than the Anders procedure.  
Initially, appointed counsel’s brief would not need to contain a full 
professional evaluation of the record to address all potential issues.  A merits 
brief raising a single frivolous issue could be much more streamlined.  
Although abandoning the Anders procedure would require the state to use 
public resources to conduct a more thorough review the appellate record 
and draft and file a responsive brief on the merits, responding to a singular 
frivolous issue would not require the state to invest a significant amount of 
time.  Moreover, when the pro se appellant files a response to counsel’s 
motion to withdraw, the state typically writes a responsive brief, which can 
make the state’s expenditure of time on a frivolous appeal inevitable.  And, 
because frivolous issues are typically easily identifiable by an appellate court, 
and because counsel would remain obligated under rule 3.03 to disclose 
binding contrary authority in certain circumstances, the state always has the 
option of waiving its right to file a full responsive brief (as it typically does 
in Anders appeals), and simply filing a letter brief referring the court to the 
law and the record cites in lieu of a brief.209  In reviewing a singular issue, 
Texas appellate courts would not need to research each potential issue 
identified by counsel and confirm the issue is frivolous, or spend time 
combing through the record and researching any other potential issues not 
expressly addressed in the Anders brief.  While drafting an Anders opinion is 
typically less time-intensive than drafting an opinion on the merits, drafting 
a short memorandum opinion rejecting a singular frivolous issue would take 
the same amount of time, or only slightly more time, than issuing a form 
opinion in an Anders case, assuming the court exercises good drafting 
practices.  Overall, abandoning the Anders procedure would reduce costs to 
taxpayers, and promote judicial efficiency.  
 
208. E.g., Zuniga, 2018 WL 3551189, at *1–2 (discussing the conflict in both the majority and 
dissenting opinions).   
209. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01. 
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3. Other Benefits from Abandoning the Anders Procedure 
In addition to protecting the right to appointed counsel and reducing 
unnecessary expenditures of public resources, abandoning the Anders 
procedure by amending rule 3.01 would advance other public policy goals 
by eliminating the multitude of Anders dilemmas.  First, abandoning the 
Anders procedure would avoid requiring Texas appellate courts to 
compromise their judicial neutrality.  The neutrality of courts is required by 
constitutional due process guarantees and is fundamental to the justice 
system.210  By requiring Texas’s appellate courts to independently review 
the record and then identify issues to be briefed on appeal, the appellate 
court must temporarily wear the hat of appellant’s advocate.211  The court 
must then, oftentimes with only the benefit of the Anders brief, determine 
whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.212  Requiring a court to 
engage in this type of role switching undermines Texas appellate courts’ 
neutrality.213   
Second, abandoning the Anders procedure would also have jurisprudential 
benefits.  When a court of appeals issues an opinion in an Anders case, Texas 
appellate courts typically do not address any substantive issues or apply the 
law to the facts of the case.214  Instead, the court typically issues a form 
opinion reciting that the requirements of the Anders procedure have been 
met and affirming the judgment.215  An opinion disposing the merits of a 
 
210. See Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973)) (“Due process requires a neutral and detached hearing body or 
officer.”). 
211. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (discussing the Anders 
procedure). 
212. Id. at 409. 
213. See Hodgkinson, supra note 88, at 56–58 (“Judicial functions and adversarial functions are 
quite different . . . . The adversarial process is not neutral, however, and an advocate is not neutral. . . .  
There is a psychology that accompanies knowing you will file a brief that encourages advocacy, while 
reviewing a case knowing that you will probably not file a brief discourages that same advocacy.”).   
214. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. 
215. See id. (“If the issues are settled, the court should write a brief memorandum opinion no 
longer than necessary to advise the parties of the court’s decision and the basic reasons for it.”)  It is 
questionable whether courts of appeals should issue a form opinion without any analysis under the 
Anders procedure.  One of the benefits of the Anders brief is that it requires counsel to show its work 
and to think out legal issues through writing.  See In re N.F.M. and S.R.M., 582 S.W.3d 539, 542 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 2018, no pet.) (en banc) (discussing uniform Anders briefing requirements).  If the 
appellate court’s independent review is intended to be a secondary safeguard, then arguably the 
appellate court’s opinion should at least provide the basic legal analysis for why the potential issues are, 
in fact, frivolous.  TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. 
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single frivolous sufficiency issue would at least have the benefit of providing 
additional guidance for future cases.216   
Third, the Anders procedure allows indigent appellants to receive radically 
different treatment by appointed counsel and the court based solely on the 
particular preferences of appellate counsel.  The decision of whether to file 
an Anders brief or a merits brief is entirely discretionary for appointed 
counsel.  After concluding an appeal is wholly frivolous, appointed counsel 
can always choose to file a merits brief and risk disciplinary action.  And 
there is no precedent for a Texas court forcing counsel who has filed a 
frivolous merits brief challenging a conviction or sentence to, instead, file a 
motion to withdraw and an Anders brief.217  Unless the appeal is intended 
to harass or otherwise abuses the judicial process, the appellate court’s only 
remedy is to refer appointed counsel to the State Bar of Texas.  However, 
judges serving on Texas appellate courts are incredibly reluctant—even in 
the face of clear ethical violations—to refer counsel to the state bar for 
potential disciplinary action.  And the State Bar of Texas is incredibly 
hesitant to discipline a court-appointed attorney for lacking good faith in 
asserting a frivolous issue because the standard is so high.  Generally 
speaking, the appellate bar in Texas is well aware of these reluctances, which 
gives rise to a wide discrepancy in whether, and under what circumstances, 
different appointed appellate lawyers will file an Anders brief.  Many 
appointed lawyers prioritize the client’s right of counsel and never file an 
Anders brief, even if an appeal is wholly frivolous, because the risk of 
discipline is extraordinarily low.  Many do not.  As a result, indigent 
appellants may be subjected to the Anders process, or not, solely based on 
counsel’s subjective preferences.  
E. Potential Disadvantages of Texas Abandoning the Anders Procedure 
There are at least two arguable concerns with abandoning the Anders 
procedure by slightly narrowing the scope of rule 3.01: (1) frivolous issues 
harm the integrity of the judicial system; and (2) allowing counsel to argue 
frivolous issues creates a moral hazard of encouraging appointed appellate 
counsel to consider and raise only the same issues in every appeal, frivolous 
 
216. Schumm, supra note 129, at 17–18 (noting an opinion on a frivolous issue can nevertheless 
“educat[e] counsel and judges for future cases” and can require “judges to reason through a case in 
writing”).   
217. Cf. Allison v. State, 609 S.W.3d 624, 628 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020, no pet.) (requiring the 
filing of an Anders brief when counsel filed a merits brief challenging only the imposition fees, but not 
the conviction or the sentence).   
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or not, and to routinely ignore other types of issues that are potentially not 
frivolous and could result in a favorable outcome for a client.218  
1. Promoting Frivolous Appeals & Issues 
Although frivolous issues are generally unethical and should be avoided, 
the reasons why frivolous issues are unethical should be considered to 
determine whether the Anders procedure significantly protects and advances 
those interests.  Frivolous issues are unethical because they abuse legal 
procedure, are factually false, are intended to harass or malicious injure 
another, or are not made in good faith based on existing law or arguable 
changes to the law.219  Frivolous issues also unnecessarily waste public 
resources.  But when counsel is appointed to represent an indigent appellant, 
appointed counsel rarely, if ever, asserts frivolous issues to harass,  
maliciously injure the state, or to abuse the legal process.220  And on appeal, 
the relevant facts are already contained in a record and new factual assertions 
are rarely, if ever, properly asserted on appeal.  Thus, generally speaking, the 
only risk of real harm in appointed counsel asserting a frivolous issue on 
appeal is the possibility of wasted public resources and counsel’s lack of a 
good-faith basis for presenting the issue.   
Abandoning the Anders procedure would not encourage more frivolous 
appeals or more frivolous issues.  In Texas, the decision of whether to 
appeal is typically made by the client, not by appointed appellate counsel.221  
In criminal cases in Texas, notices of appeal are often filed by the appellant 
pro se or by trial counsel.  Once the notice of appeal is filed, and the 
appellant’s indigence is established, the trial court will then appoint appellate 
counsel.  Appointed appellate counsel typically does not make the decision 
of whether the appeal is filed.  And generally speaking, appellate counsel will 
be unaware of whether an appeal is wholly frivolous until after public 
 
218. See, e.g., Yee, supra note 79, at 170 (“Carving out exceptions allowing only appellate or 
defense counsel to pursue frivolous appeals not only creates a lesser standard for such counsel, but 
also refuses to hold all attorneys, appointed or retained, to the same level of competency and 
professionalism.”). 
219. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 
220. See Duggan & Moeller, supra note 95, at 101 (“The opposition—the state or federal 
government—incurs additional expense by being required to respond to a frivolous argument, but this 
hardly rises to the level of the harassment the ethical rule targets. In addition, the court’s resources are 
not being abused because, one way or another, the court will have to review the issues.”).   
221. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.02(a)(1), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (requiring the client to make decisions about objectives and 
general methods of representation). 
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resources and funds are used to prepare the appellate record.222  By the 
time appointed appellate counsel reviews the record for arguable issues, the 
appeal has already been on file with the court of appeals, usually for months; 
the trial court clerk has already spent public resources preparing the record; 
and the court reporter has already prepared a transcript at a cost to the 
taxpayers.223  If the appeal is frivolous, the waste of resources occurs 
regardless of whether counsel files an Anders brief or a frivolous merits brief.   
Out of all the evils rule 3.01 intends to safeguard against—abuse, 
harassment, wasting resources unnecessarily, and preventing arguments that 
lack a good-faith basis—the lack of appointed appellate counsel’s good-faith 
basis for asserting a singular frivolous issue is the least harmful.  The 
comparatively small harm resulting from appointed appellate counsel 
asserting a single frivolous issue is evidenced by the lack of bar grievances 
against appointed appellate counsel for asserting frivolous issues, appellate 
courts’ general unwillingness to refer appellate counsel to the state bar for 
asserting frivolous issues, and the state bar’s general aversion to attempting 
to overcome the evidentiary burden required to show a lawyer had no good-
faith basis for asserting an issue.   
Moreover, when counsel is appointed to represent an appellant with the 
right to counsel, it is also arguable that there is no such thing as a frivolous 
issue in the Anders context.  Initially, appointed counsel always has the 
option to think creatively and raise non-traditional issues.224  Furthermore, 
for an action to be frivolous, counsel must reasonably believe it is not 
supported by a good-faith argument in existing law, or a good-faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.225  
Appointed counsel likely has a good-faith basis for taking the action of filing 
a merits brief asserting a clearly non-meritorious issue if counsel believes in 
good faith that the client’s right to counsel and counsel’s fiduciary and other 
ethical obligations should prohibit withdrawal.  Counsel’s action of asserting 
a clearly non-meritorious issue also might be supported by a good-faith basis 
if counsel believes in good-faith that Texas should abandon the Anders 
procedure, as other jurisdictions have done.  In these circumstances, 
 
222. See TEX. R. APP. P. 20.2 (authorizing a free appellate record for an indigent appellant).  
223. See Duggan & Moeller, supra note 95, at 99–100 (“In every case, counsel must determine 
the overall strength of the appeal and the various issues presented.”). 
224. See Jani Maselli Wood, The Dreaded Anders Brief: Just Say No!, in 1 HANDLING YOUR FIRST 
(OR NEXT) CRIMINAL APPEALS CASE  8 (2020) (imploring appointed appellate lawyers to think outside 
of the box instead of filing an Anders brief).  
225. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01 cmt. 2.  
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appointed counsel’s good faith is not entirely lacking and thus filing a brief 
with a single, clearly non-meritorious issue is arguably never frivolous under 
rule 3.01.226  Nevertheless, because this position appears contrary to 
decisions by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,227 and because 
rule 3.01’s existing exception is unclear, rule 3.01 should be clarified.  
The Anders procedure does not ensure frivolous issues will not be asserted 
and invites the assertion of frivolous issues.  The Anders procedure merely 
attempts to ensure that appointed appellate counsel is not the individual 
asserting those issues.  In many cases, the pro se appellant will file a response 
to counsel’s Anders brief.  In the vast majority of those cases, the appellate 
court disagrees with the pro se appellant.  When the appellate court disagrees 
with the pro se appellant’s response, then the issues raised in the pro se 
appellant’s response are presumptively frivolous.  In that respect, the Anders 
procedure actually invites frivolous issues, not from attorneys, but from pro 
se appellants.  Although those frivolous issues are not presented by 
appointed counsel, the issues are nevertheless presented to the appellate 
court.  In those cases, the Anders procedure does not avoid the harm to the 
justice system caused by the mere presentation of a frivolous issue.  In other 
words, the Anders procedure invites the assertion of frivolous issues just as 
much as it discourages the assertion of frivolous issues.  
2. The Moral Hazard 
A more concerning, potential disadvantage of not allowing appellate 
counsel to file an Anders brief is that it creates a moral hazard.  Specifically, 
appointed appellate counsel may develop tunnel-vision and only consider 
one type of issue in every case while not thoroughly considering others.  If 
appointed appellate counsel knows that, after reviewing the whole record 
and determining all issues to be frivolous, counsel must, at a minimum, file 
a merits brief with a singular point, then concerns for efficiency—in light of 
the relatively low fees for taking court appointments—might tempt some 
lawyers to choose the issue at the outset of the case and not fully consider 
other potential issues, as is required by the Anders procedure.   
Although it is arguable whether this moral hazard exists at all, there are 
three factors that mitigate or could mitigate the moral hazard, assuming it 
does exist.  First, the above-described moral hazard already exists under the 
Anders procedure.  As explained previously, in an appeal, whether to file an 
 
226. Id.  
227. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 
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Anders brief is a decision solely within counsel’s discretion and drafting an 
Anders brief is often more time-consuming for appointed appellate counsel 
than drafting a rote brief raising a single sufficiency issue.228  Because the 
Anders procedure gives counsel the sole discretion as to whether to follow 
the Anders procedure, the moral hazard exists with or without the Anders 
procedure.  Second, if the Anders procedure is predicated on the 
presumption that counsel will typically abide by their ethical obligation not 
to raise frivolous issues, then a proposal to abandon the Anders procedure 
could also be predicated on the presumption that counsel will typically abide 
by their ethical obligation to zealously advocate for their client if the Anders 
procedure were abandoned.229  And third, in criminal appeals, the 
availability of writs of habeas corpus asserting ineffectiveness of appellate 
counsel is a viable and credible deterrent to appointed appellate counsel 
habitually disregarding certain parts of the record for potential issues.230  
The availability of habeas proceedings protects the rights of an indigent 
criminal defendant who receives such ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.  Unfortunately, not all civil appeals in which an indigent appellant 
has a right to appointed appellate counsel—such as appeals in which 
indigent individuals could be wrongfully deprived of their children—have a 
similarly effective check on any existing moral hazard.231 
3. Other Criticisms of Abandoning the Anders Procedure 
One commentator has noted that in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Anders, none of the justices suggested counsel should be forced to file a brief 
that lacks merit.232  There are reasonable explanations for this.  Initially, the 
Supreme Court in Anders was concerned with defining minimal protections 
for the constitutional right to counsel, not about different possible state-
level, practice-of-law solutions to the problems posed by frivolous 
 
228. See supra Part V.D (elaborating on counsel discretion in drafting and filing an Anders brief). 
229. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.01 cmt. 6. 
230. See Ex parte Flores, 387 S.W.3d 626, 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (explaining the habeas 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel). 
231. See In re I.L., 580 S.W.3d 227, 242 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, pet. dism’d) (quoting In 
re K.K., 180 S.W.3d 681, 686 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.)) (“Unlike ineffective-assistance claims 
in criminal cases, which have the writ of habeas corpus as a safety net to develop a record for such 
claims, parental-rights termination cases have no similar mechanism available.”). 
232. Teel, supra note 113, at 10 (“[N]either the majority’s decision nor the sharp dissent from 
Justice Stewart suggest that Anders’ original counsel should have been compelled to proceed with a 
frivolous appeal.”) (footnote omitted). 
  
2021] Resolving the Anders Dilemmas 139 
appeals.233  Instead, the regulation of the practice of law historically was 
and still is primarily the responsibility of the states.234  And, after Anders, 
the Supreme Court clarified the Anders procedure was just one of many 
options for protecting the right to counsel.235  Prioritizing the right to 
counsel over the competing interest of lawyers not furthering frivolous 
appeals is one of the most protective options for protecting an indigent 
appellant’s constitutional right of counsel, with which Anders was principally 
concerned.  Perhaps counterintuitively, abandoning the Anders procedure 
would provide the most protection for the right the Supreme Court sought 
to protect in Anders.   
Others have suggested that a court’s independent review of the record in 
Anders cases allows for reversals of wrongful convictions.236  But this 
argument assumes courts with staff and justices qualified, trained, or 
experienced in criminal law and criminal appeals will rigorously review the 
record in every single Anders case.  Unfortunately, this assumption is not 
correct in many Texas appellate courts.  Instead, the Anders procedure may 
have an adverse effect on attempts to overturn wrongful convictions in 
habeas proceedings, especially in the case of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel, because the court of appeals has already issued an opinion 
affirming that appointed appellate counsel did not miss any non-frivolous 
issues.237  Abandoning Anders would subject appeals that counsel has 
deemed frivolous to the same procedures as all other appeals; potentially 
meritorious issues overlooked by appellate counsel could then be raised in 
a subsequent habeas proceeding through an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim without a concern that the court of appeals has already approved of 
appointed appellate counsel’s evaluation of unraised issues.238  In sum, 
while the Anders procedure may result in the reversal of some wrongful 
 
233. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 755–45 (1967). 
234. See Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 339 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[F]ederal law rarely 
interferes with the power of state authorities to regulate the practice of law.”). 
235. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 276 (2000). 
236. See Duggan & Moeller, supra note 95, at 102 (“If counsel fails to identify a meritorious 
issue, there is no appellate court waiting in the wings to uncover it.”). 
237. See Hodgkinson, supra note 88, at 64 (“[T]he direct appeal from conviction is the last 
significant chance for substantial review of that person’s conviction; without a lawyer to guide the 
person though the maze, the client will not even get that review and, in fact, will likely have other 
avenues of review closed off by procedural default.”).  
238. Warner, supra note 91, at 666 (“If counsel, by failing to raise issues that could lead to 
reversal, does not provide effective assistance in the brief, the indigent defendant would still have the 
same right as other criminal defendants to secure relief pursuant to a postconviction claim for 
ineffectiveness of counsel.”). 
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convictions on direct appeal, the Anders procedure may also present barriers 
to reversing wrongful convictions in a habeas proceeding.   
F. For Texas, Abandoning Anders is Better than Alternative Solutions  
Abandoning the Anders procedure altogether is a better option for Texas 
than adopting variations of the procedure.  The disadvantages associated 
with the appellate court’s compromised neutrality are not wholly addressed 
by limiting the court’s independent review to only the issues identified in 
appointed counsel’s Anders brief.  Even a limited independent review 
requires the court to compromise its neutrality.239  A three-tiered 
appointment system, which would eliminate judicial review altogether, 
might be feasible in federal courts for which Congress is the primary source 
of funds,240 but it is not likely a feasible uniform approach for Texas.  In 
Texas, the legislature funds the courts of appeals, and the state’s 254 
counties generally pay the bill for appointment of appellate counsel.  
Abandoning the Anders procedure altogether eliminates the dilemmas 
caused by the appellate court’s role-shifting without any additional costs to 
counties, the legislature, or the courts in nearly all frivolous appeals.  
Other variants of Anders, such as the alternative briefing procedure by 
which appointed counsel prepares a brief for the appellant but does not 
assert any arguments on behalf of the client, do not undermine the right to 
counsel as much as the Anders procedure.241  But these alternatives 
nevertheless undermine the right to counsel by forcing pro se appellants 
who are generally not educated, licensed, or trained in criminal defense and 
appellate law to be their own advocates.  These alternatives also deprive 
indigent appellants of the benefit of a fresh appellate perspective in framing 
issues and facts to support the issues a pro se appellant might argue.242  
And, while eliminating the Anders procedure except in certain types of cases 
(such as probation revocation and resentencing) comes the closest to 
resolving many of the disadvantages of the Anders procedure, this variant 
 
239. See Fazekas, supra note 83, at 597 (arguing for a court’s limited independent review of the 
record).  
240. See generally Pollis, supra note 78, at 485 (arguing for the adoption of a three-tier 
appointment system). 
241. See People v. Wende, 600 P.2d 1071, 1072 (Cal. 1979) (describing alternate briefing 
procedure); see also OR. R. APP. P. 5.90 (outlining Oregon’s appellate briefing procedure).  
242. See Schumm, supra note 129, at 18 (arguing this approach would “deny[] litigants the fresh 
perspective of appellate lawyers with specialized expertise in finding, researching, framing and arguing 
appellate issues”). 
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nevertheless remains subject to the Anders dilemmas that currently exist for 
those categories of cases.  Thus, the best solution for Texas is to simply 
abandon the Anders procedure altogether.  
VII.    CONCLUSION 
Texas should abandon the Anders procedure by narrowly expanding the 
existing exception to rule 3.01 and allowing appointed appellate counsel to 
file a merits brief in any appeal in which the appellant has the right to 
counsel, even if doing so would require counsel to assert what would 
otherwise be considered a frivolous issue.  Abandoning Anders would 
resolve numerous dilemmas for appointed counsel, indigent appellants, 
courts, and the state, and would be more judicially efficient.  Most 
importantly, abandoning the Anders procedure would rightly prioritize 
rigorously protecting indigent appellants’ right to counsel over the marginal 
harm created by appointed counsel asserting a singular frivolous issue in the 
zealous representation of clients on appeal.243  Rigorously protecting the 
right to counsel is essential because effective assistance of counsel is the 
lynchpin for safeguarding all other rights in criminal prosecutions.   
Although abandoning the Anders procedure would not be a panacea for 
Texas’s indigent-defense system, affording more protections for indigent 
defendants’ right to counsel would help improve the integrity of the judicial 
process by better advancing the criminal justice system’s truth-seeking 
functions.  Increasing protections for the right to counsel would provide at 
least one way to reduce the disparate treatment of indigent individuals, who 
are being prosecuted and incarcerated en masse, disproportionately affected 
by systemic racism, and subjected to a cycle of poverty and the severest 
penalties imposable by the State of Texas.  
 
243. See Warner, supra note 91, at 667 (“Moreover, in the hierarchy of rights and obligations 
under our Constitution, the preservation of the right to counsel must have a higher priority than the 
nonconstitutionally based ethical dilemma that may arise occasionally for the attorney who finds no 
arguable error in an appeal.”). 
